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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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                     SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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               HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS, JUDGE PRESIDING
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      UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
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                                           CASE NO. 07CR00329-LAB
                    PLAINTIFF,
                                                     07CR00330-LAB
 6
              VS.
                                           SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA
                                           MARCH 19, 2007
 7
      KYLE DUSTIN FOGGO, (1)
                                           11:00 A.M.
      BRENT ROGER WILKES, (2)
 8
      BRENT ROGER WILKES, (1)
 9
      JOHN THOMAS MICHAEL, (2)
10
                    DEFENDANTS.
11
12
                          REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT
13
                           PRETRIAL CONFERENCE (1)
                           BOND HEARING (1,2)
14
                           PRETRIAL CONFERENCE (1,2)
      APPEARANCES:
15
                                    KAREN P. HEWITT, U.S. ATTORNEY
      FOR THE GOVERNMENT:
16
                                    BY: PHILLIP L.B. HALPERN, ESQ.
                                        JASON A. FORGE, ESQ.
17
                                        VALERIE CHY, ESQ.
                                    ASSISTANT U.S. ATTORNEYS
                                    880 FRONT STREET
18
                                    SAN DIEGO, CA. 92101
19
      FOR DEFENDANT FOGGO:
                                    AKIN GUMP STRAUSS HAUER & FELD
20
                                    BY: W. RANDOLPH TESLIK, ESQ.
                                         ANDREW J. DOBER, ESQ.
21
                                    1333 NEW HAMPSHIRE AVE., N.W.
                                    WASHINGTON, DC 20036-1564
22
                                    GERAGOS & GERAGOS
     FOR DEFENDANT WILKES:
                                    BY: MARK J. GERAGOS, ESO.
23
                                    350 SOUTH GRAND AVENUE, 39TH FL.
2.4
                                    LOS ANGELES, CA. 90071
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1	CONTINUED APPEARANCES:		
2	FOR DEFENDANT MICHAEL:		
3		BY: GARY K. BRUCKER, JR., ESQ 750 B STREET, SUITE 3300	•
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THE COURT: IF, AT ANY POINT, YOU CAN'T HEAR 1 2 SOMETHING THAT'S BEING SAID, INDICATE RIGHT AWAY AND I'LL HAVE 3 IT REPEATED AND HAVE PEOPLE SPEAK INTO THE MIKE. 4 NOW, THE COURT-APPOINTED SECURITY OFFICER IS ALSO 5 HERE TODAY. 6 DO YOU WANT TO STATE YOUR APPEARANCE? 7 MR. LONDERGAN: JIM LONDERGAN, COURT SECURITY 8 OFFICER. 9 THE COURT: THANK YOU. 10 THERE ARE A NUMBER OF MATTERS BEFORE THE COURT. 11 THE COURT HAS CONVENED PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE THAT IS MANDATORY UNDER THE CIPA PROVISIONS. BEFORE WE GET TO THAT, 12 THOUGH, THERE WAS A DISPUTE -- I SIGNED A PROTECTIVE ORDER 13 14 THAT WAS SENT TO ME. IT WAS INDICATED IT WAS A JOINT MOTION. 15 I ASSUME THAT EVERYONE WAS ONBOARD. I'VE SINCE RECEIVED AN 16 OPPOSITION FROM DEFENDANT FOGGO JOINED IN BY DEFENDANT WILKES 17 THAT THEY WERE NOT ONBOARD, THAT THERE'S SOME PROVISIONS THAT 18 THEY DISPUTE OR THAT ARE CONTROVERSIAL. 19 I THINK WE SHOULD PROBABLY DEAL WITH THAT FIRST 20 SINCE I SIGNED THE INITIAL ORDER. 21 MR. HALPERN: I SPOKE WITH DEFENSE COUNSEL ABOUT 22 THIS. IT WAS INITIALLY, AS I INDICATED IN MY PAPERS, STYLED A 23 THEY THOUGHT WAS IT WAS THE TERMS OF THE JOINT MOTION. 2.4 AGREEMENT. IT TURNED OUT THERE WASN'T AN AGREEMENT ON THIS. 25 I CHECKED TO PUT THOSE IN THE MOVING PAPERS. I THINK I DID.

HONOR, IS THE ENTIRE RATIONALE FOR HAVING THE PROTECTIVE

ORDER. THE REASON WE'RE HERE, THE REASON THE GOVERNMENT FOLLOWED THE PROTECTIVE ORDER IS BECAUSE WE DECIDED TO GIVE THEM CLASSIFIED INFORMATION. WE HAVE CLASSIFIED INFORMATION UNDER OUR CONTROL.

THERE ARE TIMES, WHETHER IT'S IN THIS CASE OR
HUNDREDS OF OTHER CASES, THERE WILL ALWAYS BE POTENTIAL LEAKS
OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION, OF OTHER TYPES OF INFORMATION.
WE'RE NOT SAYING IT DOESN'T HAPPEN IN THAT CASE OR THIS CASE
OR ANY CASE.

WHAT I CAN SAY IS IT HAS NOTHING FROM THE
PROSECUTION TEAM. THERE HAVE BEEN NO LEAKS. THERE CERTAINLY
HAVE BEEN NO SUGGESTIONS THAT ANY INFORMATION THAT WE HAD THAT
WE'RE UNDER CONTROL OF HAS BEEN LEAKED.

THE COURT: I DISAGREE, MR. HALPERN. LOOK AT THEIR EXHIBIT B TO THE MOTION. THE SECOND PARAGRAPH OF THIS ARTICLE, CITIZENS FOR RESPONSIBILITY & ETHICS IN WASHINGTON, READS "THE OFFICIALS, WHO SPOKE TO THE ASSOCIATED PRESS ONLY ON THE CONDITION OF ANONYMITY BECAUSE GRAND JURY PROCEEDINGS ARE SECRET AND THE CHARGES HAVE NOT BEEN FINALIZED, SAID PROSECUTORS PLANNED TO ASK THE SAN DIEGO GRAND JURY TO RETURN CHARGES HONEST SERVICE."

YOU AND I BOTH KNOW THAT'S A VIOLATION OF RULE 6. WHOEVER DID THAT SHOULDN'T HAVE DONE IT.

MR. HALPERN: CLEARLY, YOUR HONOR. BUT I DON'T THINK THERE'S AN INDICATION THAT THAT'S A MEMBER OF THE

PROSECUTION TEAM.

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THE COURT: IT'S SOMEBODY ASSOCIATED WITH THE GOVERNMENT THAT'S FORECASTING THIS FOR THE MEDIA AND TELLING THEM WHAT'S GOING ON IN FRONT OF THE GRAND JURY.

MR. HALPERN: THERE ARE MANY PEOPLE ASSOCIATED WITH THE GOVERNMENT. I'M NOT GOING TO QUARREL ON THE COURT'S POINT. I THINK YOU'RE MAKING A VALID POINT. IT DOESN'T HAVE TO DO WITH CLASSIFIED INFORMATION, THOUGH.

THE COURT: NO. IT HAS TO DO WITH LEAKING AND SECURITY CONCERNS. AND ALL THEY'RE SAYING IS "LOOK, WE'RE AGREEABLE TO BEING BOUND BY THESE RESTRICTIVE CONDITIONS. BUT IF THE WHOLE POINT IS TO PREVENT LEAKING, ALBEIT OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION, THEN WE THINK WHAT'S SAUCE FOR THE GOOSE IS SAUCE FOR THE GANDER."

MR. HALPERN: I UNDERSTAND COMPLETELY. AGAIN, IT'S NOT THAT WE OBJECT THEORETICALLY TO ALL OF THE PROPOSALS. IN FACT, WE MADE THE PROPOSALS IN THE FIRST PLACE. WE THINK THEY'RE GOOD PROPOSALS. IT'S THE CONTEXT IT COMES IN. WE ARE BOUND ANYWAY. I WOULD SUGGEST SOME OF THE PROPOSALS, IN TERMS OF THE TWO OF US, DON'T MAKE THE SAME AMOUNT OF SENSE, IN ANY EVENT. I THINK THEY'VE REALIZED THAT.

AND TO CUT BACK SOME AND TRY TO TEAR IT AWAY AND SAY "WELL, THESE DO MAKE SENSE," I'M NOT EVEN SURE THAT'S TRUE, WITH ALL DUE RESPECT TO MR. LONDERGAN. AND I HAVE NOTHING BUT RESPECT FOR HIM, AND I THINK HE'S GOING TO DO HIS JOB IN A

FIRST-RATE MANNER. THERE ARE OTHER PEOPLE IN THE GOVERNMENT
THAT WE ALSO GO TO THAT WE HAVE TO GO THROUGH.

THERE ARE SECURED FACILITIES WE HAVE ALL OVER THAT
WE HAVE TO DEAL WITH. THERE ARE PEOPLE -- FOR EXAMPLE, EVERY
TIME WE WANT TO BRING ANOTHER AGENT ON THE CASE, WE SHOULDN'T
HAVE TO GO TO GET MR. LONDERGAN'S APPROVAL. THIS IS SOMETHING
WE'VE DONE FOR THE LAST COUPLE OF MONTHS. IT'S SOMETHING
WE'LL CONTINUE TO DO.

THE COURT: I DON'T THINK THEY'RE ASKING THAT.

THEY'RE SAYING BEFORE YOU DISCLOSE CLASSIFIED INFORMATION TO

ANOTHER AGENT, THAT MAYBE THAT OUGHT TO BE RUN BY THE COURT

SECURITY OFFICER, TOO.

MR. HALPERN: I THINK THAT MAKES PERFECT SENSE WHEN WE'RE DEALING WITH THIS BENCH. I DON'T THINK IT MAKES ANY SENSE WHEN WE'RE DEALING WITH A TEAM OF CIA AGENTS, ALL WHO HAVE CLEARANCE, ALL WHO ARE PART OF A PROSECUTION TEAM, OR IF WE WANT TO BRING SOMEONE ELSE WHO'S CLEARED ONTO THE PROSECUTION TEAM.

THE COURT: SOMEBODY IGNORED THE CONVENTIONS OF

FEDERAL CRIMINAL PRACTICE AND RULE 6 IN THE TWO DISCLOSURES

THAT WERE MADE. SOMEBODY DID. AND I'M CONCERNED ABOUT THAT.

AND I THINK IT MAKES A STATEMENT IF I SAY, "LOOK, EVERYBODY IS

GOING TO BE SUBJECT TO THESE RULES, AND THE RULES ARE

ENFORCEABLE BY THE COURT. YOU FACE WHATEVER LEGAL CHARGES

STEM FROM THIS, BUT ALSO CONTEMPT OF THE COURT IF YOU DO THIS.

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THERE'S A COURT ORDER IN PLACE SAYING YOU'RE TO COMPLY WITH
THESE PROCEDURES."

AGAIN, I'M NOT ASSUMING THAT THIS HAS ANYTHING TO DO WITH YOU OR MR. FORGE OR MS. CHU. I'M ASSUMING IT WAS SOMEBODY ELSE WHO WAS ANXIOUS TO GET A HEADLINE OR DO SOMETHING THAT LED TO THIS.

I TAKE YOUR POINT, MR. HALPERN, THAT WHOEVER IT WAS DIDN'T DISCLOSE CONFIDENTIAL SECRET NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION, BUT IT WAS STILL -- IT'S A PRETTY EGREGIOUS VIOLATION TO SAY, "HERE'S WHAT'S GOING ON IN FRONT OF THE GRAND JURY, AND EXPECT AN INDICTMENT IN THE NEXT COUPLE OF WEEKS."

MR. HALPERN: YOUR HONOR, THERE'S NO WAY I WILL

DEFEND THAT ACTION BE WHOEVER IT WAS MADE, AND I DON'T INTEND

TO. I'M NOT GOING TO PROTECT TOO MUCH AT THIS POINT. I THINK

THE COURT UNDERSTANDS THE ISSUES.

BUT I WOULD JUST SAY THAT IN TERMS OF THE CIPA
HEARING AND THE RULES THAT WERE SET FORTH, I'M NOT SURE THAT'S
THE MOST LOGICAL. IF THE COURT IS GOING TO DO IT IN ANY
EVENT, THAT'S ONE THING. BUT ANOTHER EXAMPLE WOULD BE WHY ARE
WE DOING IT UNDER CIPA? DOING IT UNDER THE EXACT TERMS THAT
WE LISTED DOESN'T MAKE SENSE WOULD BE THE PROVISION HAVING TO
DO WITH THE SKIP.

OBVIOUSLY, WE DON'T WANT TO GO TO MR. LONDERGAN

EVERY TIME WE WANT TO DISCUSS SOMETHING. WE HAVE SECURE AREAS

1 IN OUR BUILDING AND OTHER PLACES. WE MEET ALL THE TIME AT 2 OTHER PLACES. IT SIMPLY DOES NOT MAKE SENSE.

THE COURT: I DON'T THINK I'D IMPOSE THAT ON YOU

BECAUSE I'M AWARE THAT YOU DO HAVE -- YOU HAVE A SKIP ALREADY,

RIGHT?

MR. HALPERN: OH, ABSOLUTELY.

THE COURT: A VAULT. SO I DON'T THINK I'D IMPOSE
THAT. IT'S BECAUSE DEFENSE COUNSEL DOESN'T HAVE THAT, AS A
MATTER OF COURSE, IN THEIR OFFICE THAT THEY'RE GOING TO HAVE
TO GO TO MR. LONDERGAN TO LOOK AT ALL OF IT. I'M TALKING
ABOUT JUST SETTING SOME RULES AS FAR AS DISCLOSURE IS
CONCERNED, WHICH IS WHAT THEY'RE ASKING FOR.

THAT'S THE GIST OF THE MOTION THAT I HAVE ON THE FIRST POINT, IS THEY SAY THAT THEY'RE INTERESTED IN PROTECTING THIS STUFF. LET'S HOLD THEM TO THAT STATEMENT.

MR. HALPERN: IF ALL THE COURT IS SAYING AND THE DEFENSE IS SAYING IS THEY SIMPLY WANT THE GOVERNMENT TO BE AWARE THAT IF WE DISCLOSE CLASSIFIED INFORMATION IMPROPERLY, MEANING THROUGH A GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE OR OTHERWISE DISSEMINATE IN AN IMPROPER MANNER, WE WILL BE HELD NOT ONLY TO OUR NORMAL SANCTIONS, BUT TO CONTEMPT OF COURT. WE WOULD EMBRACE THAT, YOUR HONOR. WE WOULD NOT ARGUE ABOUT IT ONE BIT.

THE COURT: WHAT ABOUT THE OTHER POINT THEY MAKE?

THERE'S BEEN ARGUMENT ABOUT COUNSEL'S EYES ONLY.

MR. HALPERN: I DON'T KNOW IF THE COURT HAD A CHANCE

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TO READ THE GOVERNMENT'S FILE --

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THE COURT: I DID.

MR. HALPERN: -- THAT WE MADE ON FRIDAY. I THINK I ADDRESSED THAT, ALSO. I THINK, ONCE AGAIN, THAT'S PROBABLY A BIG BROUHAHA ABOUT NOTHING. WE WERE ATTEMPTING TO DO THAT IN A MANNER THAT WE THOUGHT MADE SENSE. IT WASN'T ABOUT SHIFTING THE BURDEN AND HAVING THEM HAVE AN UNEQUAL BURDEN. WE JUST THOUGHT THEY WOULDN'T WANT THE GOVERNMENT TO COME EX PARTE TO THE COURT AND MAKE AN ARGUMENT, HAVE THE COURT SAY "YOU'RE RIGHT, GOVERNMENT," THEN THEY GO "HOLD ON. THAT'S WRONG. WE HAVE TO BE HEARD."

WE JUST THINK BOTH SIDES SHOULD BE HEARD. WE'LL GIVE THEM THE INFO. IF THEY SAY THAT'S A PROBLEM, THEY CAN CALL US AND WE CAN DISCUSS IT. IF WE CAN'T DECIDE IT, WE'LL JUST GO TO THE COURT ABOUT IT. IT JUST SEEMED LIKE AN EMINENTLY REASONABLE PROCEDURE. AND TO NOT ADOPT IT SIMPLY IMPOSES A BURDEN UPON THE COURT THAT WE DON'T THINK MAKES SENSE.

AGAIN, IT'S THE COURT'S BURDEN MORE THAN US. AND WE DON'T THINK COMING TO YOU FIRST EX PARTE ABOUT SOMETHING THAT WE'RE DEBATING GIVING THEM WOULD BE THE OPTIMAL SOLUTION EITHER FOR THE COURT OR THE DEFENSE.

THE COURT: YOU'VE SAID THAT ONE OF THE ISSUES THAT
WAS PRESENTED IN THE PAPERS HAS BEEN RESOLVED IN THE INTERIM?

I THOUGHT YOU SAID THAT THERE WAS ONLY --

MR. HALPERN: NO. WE HAVE AN ADDITIONAL ONE. IN 1 2 THE INTERIM, THERE WAS A THIRD ONE THAT WAS MENTIONED. AND 3 THAT HAD TO DO WITH THE CHANGE OF CLASSIFICATION STATUS, WHICH 4 MY ARGUMENT ON THAT WOULD BE VERY SIMILAR TO MY ARGUMENT ON 5 THE FIRST POINT. THIS HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH CIPA AGAIN. IT 6 SHOULDN'T BE PART OF ANY CIPA ORDER. IT DOESN'T NEED TO BE 7 ORDERED. WE'RE OBVIOUSLY GIVING THEM DISCOVERY THAT IS 8 CLASSIFIED. WE'VE MADE AN AGREEMENT. AS SOON AS THEY GET THE 9 APPROPRIATE SECURITY CLEARANCE, IT WILL BE MARKED TO INDICATE 10 WHAT THE CLASSIFICATION IS. 11 IF THAT CHANGES, YOU HAVE THE GOVERNMENT'S 12 REPRESENTATION YOU DON'T NEED AN ORDER. WE, OF COURSE, WILL TELL THEM IF THERE'S A CHANGE. IT ONLY MAKES SENSE FOR US TO 13 14 DO SO. WE INTENDED ON DOING SO. IF WE HAD DISCUSSED THAT, THAT WOULD HAVE BEEN A POSITION WE WOULD HAVE RELATED AT THAT 15 16 POINT. 17 THE COURT: ANYTHING ELSE ON THIS POINT? 18 MR. HALPERN: NOT FROM THE GOVERNMENT, YOUR HONOR. 19 THE COURT: LET ME HEAR, THEN, ON BEHALF OF 20 MR. FOGGO. 21 MR. TESLIK: RANDY TESLIK FOR DEFENDANT FOGGO. 22 YOUR HONOR, I'LL ADDRESS THE SECOND TWO POINTS THAT YOUR HONOR ADDRESSED. 23

THE COURT AND SEEKING COURT AUTHORITY BEFORE MATERIAL CAN BE

THE FIRST IS WITH RESPECT TO THE BURDEN OF COMING TO

24

1 ARTICULATED.

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THE COURT: AS A PRACTICAL MATTER, I HAVE LESS

PROBLEM WITH THAT IN FOGGO'S CASE BECAUSE HE PROBABLY KNOWS

THE INFORMATION ALREADY TO BEGIN WITH.

BUT MR. GERAGOS, YOU'VE JOINED IN IT. I WANT TO
HEAR FROM YOU. IT'S NOT NECESSARILY SO WITH RESPECT TO
MR. WILKES. I DON'T THINK THE GOVERNMENT'S GOING TO DISCLOSE
ANYTHING THAT MR. FOGGO DOESN'T ALREADY KNOW.

MR. GERAGOS: THAT'S EXACTLY RIGHT. ACTUALLY, MY

POSITION HAS ALMOST EVOLVED SINCE I JOINED. IT HAS. IT'S NOT

ACTUALLY. I'M IN A SITUATION WHERE MY CLIENT, BY VIRTUE OF

THE INDICTMENT -- YOU CAN READ IT -- HAS NO SECURITY

CLEARANCE. I DON'T HAVE THE SECURITY CLEARANCE. WE'RE

TALKING ABOUT SOMEBODY WHO WAS THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF

DAY-TO-DAY OPERATIONS FOR A PERIOD OF TIME.

NOW HAVING REREAD AGAIN THE GOVERNMENT'S PAPERWORK

AS TO THE WAY THEY THINK IT'S CLASSIFIED, WHICH IS BASICALLY

THE LOCATIONS, WE KNOW THE LOCATIONS. I'VE ALMOST COME TO THE

POINT, GIVEN ALL OF THE -- I LOOK AT CIPA, AND I THINK THAT

THERE'S SOME REAL PROBLEMS. I KNOW THERE'S SOME DISTRICT

COURT CASES OUT THERE, BUT THERE'S NOT A WHOLE LOT OF CIRCUIT

COURT CASES.

I'M NOT SO SURE THAT I WANT THESE SECURITY

CLEARANCES. I'M NOT SO SURE THAT I WANT TO COME IN HERE AND

VENT WHAT IT IS UNDER SECTION 5 I'M GOING TO DO IN

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CROSS-EXAMINATION. I KNOW WHERE THE LOCATIONS WERE. MY
CLIENT HAS BEEN TO THE LOCATIONS. MY CLIENT, WITHOUT A
SECURITY CLEARANCE, KNOWS MOST OF THIS INFORMATION. IF THEY
WANT TO COME IN HERE AND REDACT THE LOCATIONS OFF OF THE
DISCOVERY AND TURN IT OVER, THAT'S FINE.

BUT I'M NOT SO SURE THAT I WANT TO GET -- I THINK

IT'S A VIOLATION OF MY CLIENT'S 6TH AMENDMENT RIGHTS TO HAVE

ME COME IN HERE, NUMBER ONE, AND HAVE THE GOVERNMENT DO SOME

KIND OF AN INITIATION OF AN INVESTIGATION OF ME AS TO WHETHER

OR NOT I'VE SATISFIED THE GOVERNMENT AS THE ATTORNEY. SO I

DON'T THINK THAT I WANT A SECURITY CLEARANCE.

NUMBER TWO, I DON'T THINK I WANT TO AGREE TO COME IN HERE AND VENT ANYTHING TO THE GOVERNMENT THAT I PLAN ON DOING.

THE COURT: HERE'S WHAT YOU'RE UP AGAINST: CIPA'S
BEEN UPHELD, AND IT'S THE LAW THAT APPLIES IN THIS CASE GIVEN
THE NATURE OF THE UNDERLYING INFORMATION.

NOW, I SUPPOSE YOU CAN WAIVE YOUR RIGHT TO HAVE THEM TURN OVER CLASSIFIED INFORMATION, WHICH IS GOING TO BE THE CONSEQUENCE IF YOU DON'T UNDERGO THE BACKGROUND INVESTIGATION AND AGREE TO THE PROVISIONS.

MR. GERAGOS: I COULD ASK THE COURT -- IT'S BEEN

UPHELD, BUT, AS I INDICATED, I DON'T THINK BY THIS CIRCUIT.

AND MAYBE WHAT THE MORE PRUDENT THING TO DO IS TO GIVE THIS

COURT -- LET ME OUTLINE WHY I THINK THAT IT'S INAPPROPRIATE

FOR -- IN THIS CASE SPECIFICALLY. BECAUSE WE HAVE A DIFFERENT

SITUATION.

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IN THE CASES THAT I'VE REVIEWED, THE <u>BIN LADEN CASE</u>,
WHICH WAS OUT OF NEW YORK, AND THE <u>JOIAT</u> (PHONETIC) CASE AS
WELL. IN THOSE SITUATIONS, YOU HAD -- AND EVEN GOING BACK TO
POINDEXTER -- YOU HAD SITUATIONS WHERE -- IN <u>BIN LADEN</u>, THERE
WAS SOMEBODY WHO WAS NOT -- WHO HAD NOT BEEN AFFORDED A
SECURITY CLEARANCE BEFORE. IN THE <u>POINDEXTER</u> CASE, YOU HAD
SOMEBODY WHO HAD BEEN AFFORDED A SECURITY CLEARANCE.

HERE WE'RE JOINING TOGETHER TWO DEFENDANTS, ONE WHO
HAS A SECURITY CLEARANCE AND OBVIOUSLY COULDN'T BE MUCH HIGHER
THAN HIS SECURITY CLEARANCE, I ASSUME -- HE'S THE DEPUTY
DIRECTOR -- AND SOMEBODY WHO DOES NOT.

AND THE INFORMATION THAT I BELIEVE -- AT LEAST
WHAT'S BEEN KIND OF REPRESENTED IN THE PAPERWORK -- IS NOT
SOMETHING THAT I REALLY THINK IS ALL THAT -- IT'S NOT GOING TO
STOP THE PRESSES. SO I DON'T REALLY KNOW THAT IT'S GOING TO
HELP ME. AND GIVEN THAT SITUATION AND THE DISPARATE POSITIONS
OF THE TWO DEFENDANTS, I THINK THAT MAYBE THIS COURT COULD
TAKE A LOOK AT THIS AND THAT THERE ARE SOME PROBLEMS THAT NEED
TO BE ADDRESSED.

THE COURT: YOU CAN BRING THE MOTION, AND I'LL LOOK
AT IT. BUT I THINK THE CONSEQUENCE OF UPHOLDING THIS STATUTE
HERE WOULD BE THAT YOU HAVE AN ELECTION TO MAKE. IF YOU DON'T
WANT TO AVAIL YOURSELF OF THE MATERIAL, THEN I SUPPOSE YOU
DON'T HAVE TO BE SUBJECTED TO A BACKGROUND CHECK AND TOP

SECRET CLEARANCE, AND THAT WOULD BE YOUR CHOICE. THAT ASSUMES
THAT I DON'T FIND SOME FAULT WITH THE STATUTE.

I UNDERSTAND THE DIFFERENCES YOU'RE POINTING OUT
BETWEEN MR. WILKES AND THE OTHER DEFENDANTS WHO'VE BEEN
SUBJECT TO THE PROCEDURE BEFORE, BUT IT REALLY TURNS ON THE
NATURE OF THE INFORMATION.

THAT'S THE GENESIS FOR THIS PROVISION; RIGHT?

MR. GERAGOS: THAT'S EXACTLY RIGHT. THAT'S WHY I'M

SAYING THAT MAYBE THE BETTER WAY TO APPROACH THIS IS LET ME

BRIEF IT FOR THE COURT. IF THE COURT UPHOLDS IT, THEN I'LL

MAKE THE ELECTION. IF THE COURT MAYBE SEES IT MY WAY, THEN

MAYBE WE DON'T HAVE TO GET TO THAT POINT.

ONE OTHER THING THAT I FEEL COMPELLED TO TALK ABOUT A LITTLE BIT, BECAUSE MR. MAC DOUGALL AND MR. TESLIK IN THEIR MOTION HAD MENTIONED IT, THERE'S SOMETHING PARTICULARLY GALLING ABOUT THE IDEA OF MY OFFICE BEING UNDER A PROTECTIVE ORDER WHEN ALL INFORMATION FOR THE THREE WEEKS PRIOR TO THIS INDICTMENT CAME FROM WHAT I READ IN THE PRESS AND WHAT REPORTERS WERE LEAVING MESSAGES ON MY VOICEMAIL.

POOR MR. HALPERN, I WOULD CALL HIM ALMOST DAILY AND THEN WROTE LETTERS TO HIM SAYING, "I'M NOW HEARING" -- I WOULD FAX HIM THE ARTICLES AS THEY WOULD COME IN. I SENT HIM LETTERS SAYING, "LOOK, WE'RE NOT ONLY DISCUSSING 6E MATERIAL. I HAD A REPORTER CALL UP AND LEAVE A MESSAGE THAT THEY HAD VIEWED" -- BEFORE THE INDICTMENTS, TWO INDICTMENTS,

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POST-INDICTMENTS, THEY KNEW SPECIFICALLY THAT ONE HAD TO DO WITH CUNNINGHAM. THEY KNEW THE OTHER ONE HAD TO DO WITH FOGGO. THEY LEFT THE MESSAGE AS TO WHAT THE SPECIFICS WERE.

I CALLED MR. HALPERN AND TOLD HIM -- AND I'VE DEALT WITH MR. HALPERN BEFORE ON OTHER CASES AND HAD NO BELIEF WHATSOEVER THAT HE HAD ANYTHING TO DO WITH IT. IN FACT, I THINK HE WAS DEALING WITH SOMETHING ELSE AT THE TIME AND WAS KIND OF BLIND-SIDED.

BUT THE DAILY DRUMBEAT OF WHAT WAS BEING RELEASED,
FROM MY CLIENT'S STANDPOINT, I THINK WAS DESIGNED TO DO
NOTHING MORE THAN TORCH HIS DEAL ON SELLING OF THE PROPERTY,
NUMBER ONE. AND SOMEBODY WAS OUT THERE, I BELIEVE, TRYING TO
PUT SOME PRESSURE ON GETTING THE FIRE UNDER THE U.S. ATTORNEYS
AND EVERYTHING ELSE, TRYING TO PUT SOME PRESSURE ON TO BRING
THE INDICTMENT BECAUSE THERE WAS A BACK-AND-FORTH BETWEEN MAIN
JUSTICE AND WHAT WAS HAPPENING HERE IN SAN DIEGO.

SO NOW FOR THE GOVERNMENT -- I UNDERSTAND THAT
THEY'RE COMING IN BECAUSE THEY'VE GOT THE CLASSIFIED
INFORMATION. THEY HAVE TO DO IT. BUT THIS IDEA OF IT BEING
UNILATERAL, AS I THINK THE COURT HAS ALREADY INDICATED, MAKES
LITTLE OR NO SENSE. AND THEY HAVE ADVANTAGES THAT WE DON'T
HAVE AND ESPECIALLY I DON'T HAVE AS NOT BEING IN THIS
DISTRICT.

THE IDEA OF NOT BEING ABLE TO GET ON A PHONE WHEN

I'M DOWN HERE TO CALL MY OFFICE AND TALK ABOUT CERTAIN THINGS

THAT ARE IN THE MATERIAL IS JUST IMPOSSIBLE FOR ME TO BE ABLE TO DO. THE IDEA OF EVERY TIME I WANT TO SEE SOMETHING, I'VE GOT TO RUN DOWN HERE TO A SAFE ROOM IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR ME TO DO. IT'S ESPECIALLY GALLING, AS I INDICATE, WHEN I'VE GOT REPORTERS WHO HAVE BEEN VENTED ALL THE INFORMATION PRIOR TO IT HAPPENING. AND MR. HALPERN, TO HIS CREDIT, WOULD NEVER AFFIRM OR DENY ANYTHING THAT I WAS GETTING EVEN IF IT WAS 18 HOURS BEFORE I WAS TOLD TO COME DOWN HERE AND SURRENDER MY CLIENT.

I KNEW BEFORE -- THE ONLY WAY I FOUND OUT THAT

MR. WILKES WAS GOING TO GET INDICTED WAS WHEN I GOT A CALL

FROM A REPORTER SAYING, "THEY'RE GOING TO BRING THE GRAND JURY

IN. IT'S GOING TO HAPPEN ON A TUESDAY. YOU'RE GOING TO BE

ORDERED DOWN HERE ON A WEDNESDAY."

THERE'S SOMETHING EXTREMELY DISTURBING ABOUT IT. I
HAD ASKED AS A REMEDY THAT EVERYBODY, ALL OF THEIR AGENTS,
STATE UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY THAT IT WASN'T THEM. I'VE BEEN
INVOLVED IN THE NORTHERN DISTRICT HERE BEING INVESTIGATED BY
THE CENTRAL DISTRICT IN THE BONDS INVESTIGATION AS TO WHO DID
THE LEAKING, THE CENTRAL DISTRICT BEING INVESTIGATED BY THE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT AS TO WHO WAS DOING THE LEAKING IN THE
PELICANO CASE, WHICH WE'RE TANGENTIALLY INVOLVED IN AS WELL.

AND WE'VE GOT ALL THESE U.S. ATTORNEYS' OFFICES

INVESTIGATING WHO'S DOING THE LEAKING, AND WE NEVER GET ANY

ANSWERS EXCEPT FROM THE NORTHERN DISTRICT, AND IT TURNS OUT TO

BE THE DEFENSE LAWYER. I DON'T EVEN WANT TO GO THERE. I'D

2.4

1 RATHER BE IN A POSITION WHERE I DON'T HAVE TO GIVE THE 2 INFORMATION.

2.4

THE COURT: MR. TESLIK, TALK TO ME ABOUT THE OTHER MODIFICATIONS OF THE ORDER THAT I SIGNED THAT YOU ADVOCATE.

MR. TESLIK: THERE'S ONLY ONE MORE, YOUR HONOR.

THAT'S THE THIRD POINT, THE NOTICE OF CHANGES IN

CLASSIFICATION STATUS. THE REASON WHY THAT'S IMPORTANT TO US

IS BECAUSE THERE'S REALLY A DISTINCTION BETWEEN INSIDER CASES

LIKE POINDEXTER AND THIS ONE AND CASES DEALING WITH PERSONS

WHO WERE NEVER CLEARED.

OBVIOUSLY, OUR CLIENT, AS MR. GERAGOS JUST POINTED

OUT, HAD INCREDIBLE ACCESS TO THE MOST HIGHLY CLASSIFIED

INFORMATION. AND NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT HE'S NO LONGER

WITH THE CIA, HE STILL HAS THAT INFORMATION IN HIS HEAD. AND

HE IS UNDER CONTRACT TO NOT DISCLOSE IT, AND HE CERTAINLY

WON'T DISCLOSE IT.

SO THE PROBLEM THAT WE HAVE ISN'T SO MUCH WITH WRITTEN MATERIALS THAT WILL BE PROVIDED TO US WITH A TS STAMP OR A CLASSIFIED STAMP. AND I CERTAINLY TRUST THE GOVERNMENT'S REPRESENTATIONS THAT THEY'LL NOTIFY US IF THERE'S EVER A CHANGE IN THOSE CLASSIFICATIONS.

THE COURT: ISN'T THAT SUFFICIENT AT THIS POINT?

MR. TESLIK: IT'S NOT, YOUR HONOR. BECAUSE WITH

RESPECT TO AN ISSUE THAT WE'LL BE DISCUSSING WITH MR. FOGGO,

AN ISSUE THAT MAY BE CLASSIFIED AT THE TS LEVEL OR CLASSIFIED

AT THE SECRET LEVEL, IN THE EVENT THAT THERE'S A CHANGE IN

THAT CLASSIFICATION, THEN UNDER THE PARAMETERS OF THE

PROTECTIVE ORDER, IT'S GOING TO CHANGE THE MECHANISMS BY WHICH

WE DISCUSS THE CASE WITH OUR CLIENT.

AND ALL WE'RE ASKING -- WE DON'T EXPECT THERE TO BE A PLETHORA OF CHANGES IN THE CLASSIFICATION STATUSES. BUT WHEN THERE IS A CHANGE IN THE CLASSIFICATION STATUS, WE'D ASK THE GOVERNMENT TO GIVE US NOTICE OF IT WITHOUT HAVING TO ASK FOR IT OR FILE SOME SORT OF DEMAND. THAT WAY WE'LL KNOW WHAT WE CAN TALK TO MR. FOGGO ABOUT AND UNDER WHAT LEVELS OF PROTECTION.

THE COURT: MR. PITOFSKY, DO YOU HAVE ANY POSITION ON THIS PARTICULAR ISSUE?

MR. PITOFSKY: I DON'T BELIEVE SO. I DON'T BELIEVE
THAT THE CONFIDENTIAL DISCLOSURES REALLY TOUCH MR. MICHAEL.
WE HAVE THE SAME STRONG COMPLAINTS ABOUT THE LEAKS FROM
BEFORE, BUT I THINK THEY'RE UNRELATED TO THIS ISSUE.

THE COURT: ANYTHING ELSE, MR. HALPERN?

MR. HALPERN: WELL, I WAS JUST GOING TO SAY I DIDN'T THINK MR. PITOFSKY HAD A DOG IN THIS FIGHT IN THE SENSE THAT HE REALLY IS NOT UNDER THE CIPA UMBRELLA.

THE COURT: THIS IS THE WILKES/FOGGO INDICTMENT THAT THIS RELATES TO.

MR. HALPERN: YES, YOUR HONOR. I THINK MR. FORGE
HAD A POINT THAT HE WANTED TO MAKE BEFORE THE COURT RULED. I

JUST WANTED TO QUICKLY RESPOND TO THE LAST POINT THAT

MR. TESLIK MADE.

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YOUR HONOR, IT'S VERY EASY WHEN WE LOOK AT A CASE

AND WE SEE THE RANGE OF MATERIAL THAT'S POTENTIALLY RELEVANT

TO SAY, "HERE'S THE CLASSIFICATION OF IT." IT'S DIFFICULT TO

KNOW -- WE HAVE NO IDEA WHAT THE DEFENSE IS GOING TO BE. WE

HAVE NO IDEA ABOUT THE RANGE OF INFORMATION THAT MR. FOGGO HAS

OTHER THAN TO SAY IT'S EXTENSIVE.

HE WAS THE INDIVIDUAL, AS MR. TESLIK INDICATED,
RUNNING THE CIA ON A DAILY BASIS FOR A LONG PERIOD OF TIME.

HE HAS ACCESS LITERALLY TO AS MUCH CLASSIFIED INFORMATION AS
ANYBODY IN THIS COUNTRY. THAT ALL MAY CHANGE ON A DAILY BASIS

IF THEY GET BUMPED UP. SOME OF THESE THINGS HE KNOWS ABOUT

MAY BE BUMPED DOWN. WE HAVE NO WAY OF KNOWING. WE CAN'T

PREDICT IT.

ALL WE CAN SAY IS TO THE EXTENT THAT WE HAVE

GATHERED CLASSIFIED INFORMATION RELATED TO THIS CASE. IF THAT

CHANGES, WE'LL LET THEM KNOW. THAT'S ALL WE'RE PHYSICALLY

ABLE TO DO AS WELL AS THEORETICALLY ABLE TO DO.

MR. FORGE: I THINK I'LL TAKE THE LECTERN, YOUR HONOR, SO MR. PITOFSKY CAN HEAR.

YOUR HONOR, I WANT TO MAKE IT CLEAR TO THE COURT -AND I THINK MR. HALPERN DID THIS AS WELL -- THE LEAKS OF THE
INFORMATION TO THE PRESS WERE ABSOLUTELY REPREHENSIBLE AND
COMPLETELY INEXCUSABLE.

THE COURT: ARE YOU DOING AN INVESTIGATION TO FIND
OUT WHO DID THIS?

MR. FORGE: I'M NOT IN A POSITION TO DISCLOSE THAT
IN OPEN COURT, BUT I WILL STATE THAT NOTHING WOULD PLEASE ME
MORE THAN TO DETERMINE WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THAT AND GET
THEM IN FRONT OF THIS COURT TO BE HELD ACCOUNTABLE FOR HAVING
DONE THAT. IT'S EMBARRASSING. IT'S REPREHENSIBLE AND
INEXCUSABLE. AND I DON'T IN ANY WAY QUESTION WHY DEFENSE
COUNSEL ON BOTH COATS WOULD BE SO UPSET ABOUT THIS. IT IS NOT
THE WAY THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE HANDLING BUSINESS.

THE COURT: I WAS UPSET WHEN I READ IT. BUT THE
ADDITION THAT MR. GERAGOS MENTIONED, THAT SOMEBODY -APPARENTLY SOMEBODY WHO HAD BEEN SHOWN THE INDICTMENTS
BEFOREHAND KNEW ABOUT THOSE AND COMMUNICATED THAT TO A MEMBER
OF THE MEDIA, WHO THEN CALLED MR. GERAGOS AND SAID "LOOK,
HERE'S WHAT THE INDICTMENTS ARE GOING TO SAY," THAT'S WAY
BEYOND EVEN WHAT I READ ABOUT "THERE'S A PENDING GRAND JURY
INVESTIGATION, AND INDICTMENTS ARE EXPECTED." THAT'S
SOMETHING THAT, IN MY JUDGMENT, IS A CLEAR VIOLATION.
SOMEBODY OUGHT TO BE TAKEN TO TASK FOR THAT.

MR. FORGE: I AGREE. I'M FAMILIAR WITH ALL THE PRESS REPORTS AND THE EXTENT OF THE LEAKS, AND WE'RE TAKING THAT VERY SERIOUSLY.

WE TURN, ACTUALLY, TO THE CIPA PROTECTIVE ORDER. I
THINK THE POINTS YOUR HONOR MADE ARE ALL WELL-TAKEN. BUT WHEN

YOU ACTUALLY LOOK AT THE DETAILS OF THE RECIPROCAL PROVISIONS
THAT ARE REQUESTED BY MR. FOGGO AND JOINED BY MR. WILKES, THE
MAJORITY OF THEM, IF YOU GO ONE BY ONE, ARE TIED TO SECURE
AREA PROVISIONS. AND CLEARLY, THAT IS THE DEFINING TERM UNDER
THE COURT'S PROTECTIVE ORDER, AT PAGE 5 OF THE COURT'S
PROTECTIVE ORDER.

THE FIRST -- ACTUALLY, IF WE TAKE THEM ONE BY ONE.

AT PAGE 4, SECTION 9, THE FILING OF PAPERS BY EITHER PARTY,

AGAIN, FOR US TO CLEAR OUR PAPERS WITH THE COURT SECURITY

OFFICER IS NOT WHAT WE'RE TALKING ABOUT WITH THESE LEAKS.

IT'S NOT THE ROLE OF THE COURT SECURITY OFFICER VIS-A-VIS

COLLEAGUES WITHIN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH.

WHEN YOU MOVE ON TO THE GUTS OF THEIR REQUESTS, THE NEXT PAGE, PAGE 5, THIS IS WHAT MR. HALPERN WAS TALKING ABOUT, AND THIS IS WHAT I WANTED TO MAKE SURE THAT THE COURT WAS FOCUSING ON IN DETERMINING WHAT WOULD BE APPROPRIATE FOR RECIPROCAL OBLIGATIONS ON THE PART OF THE GOVERNMENT.

IF YOU LOOK AT THE SECTION 13(C) REQUEST, WE'RE TALKING ABOUT WORD-PROCESSING EQUIPMENT APPROVED EITHER BY A COURT SECURITY OFFICER OR THE GOVERNMENT EXECUTIVE BRANCH AGENCY WITH ORIGINAL CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY. CLEARLY, THERE'S NO NEED FOR THAT. WE HAVE SECURE FACILITIES IN OUR OFFICE. WE HAVE SECURE FACILITIES THAT HAVE BEEN APPROVED BY THE APPROPRIATE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OFFICIALS. NOT NECESSARILY EXECUTIVE BRANCH OFFICIALS WITH THE CIA, WHICH WOULD BE THE

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ORIGINAL CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY, AND NOT NECESSARILY THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OFFICIAL WHO'S THE COURT SECURITY OFFICER HERE, BUT THERE ARE APPROVED FACILITIES.

SO THERE'S NO NEED FOR US TO THEN HAVE MR. LONDERGAN OR SOMEONE FROM THE CIA WALK THROUGH OUR OFFICE, WALK THROUGH THE FBI'S OFFICE, WALK THROUGH THE IRS'S OFFICE AND ANY OTHER AGENCY WITH WHICH WE'RE WORKING AND APPROVE THEIR FACILITY.

THERE'S NO NEED FOR THAT REDUNDANCY.

THE NEXT REQUEST AT SECTION 13(E), AGAIN, IT

REFERENCES ONLY A SECURE AREA OR AN AREA AUTHORIZED BY THE

COURT SECURITY OFFICER. NOW, "SECURE AREA," ONCE AGAIN IN

THIS CONTEXT, IS A TERM OF ART BECAUSE WE'RE TALKING ABOUT AN

AREA THAT HAS BEEN APPROVED BY THE COURT SECURITY OFFICER.

AS YOUR HONOR RECOGNIZED, WE HAVE A SKIP. THE FBI HAS A SKIP. THERE ARE OTHER SKIPS LOCATED IN THE COUNTRY. IF I TRAVEL TO LOS ANGELES TO MEET WITH MY COLLEAGUES TO DISCUSS SOMETHING THERE AND WE GO TO THEIR SKIP, THAT'S GOOD ENOUGH. AND THAT'S A RESTRICTION THAT WE HAVE. WE KNOW THE LEVEL OF CLASSIFICATION THAT WOULD REQUIRE A SKIP-ONLY DISCUSSION, AND WE FOLLOW THOSE PROCEDURES.

TWO OF THE NEXT THREE PROVISIONS, IF YOU LOOK AT 13(G), AGAIN, RESTRICTING US TO CONVERSING WITH THIS MATTER TO ANY PERSON WHO HAS BEEN GRANTED ACCESS BY THE COURT, THIS JUST GOES BACK TO MR. HALPERN'S POINT. I UNDERSTAND WHY DEFENSE COUNSEL WOULD INTUITIVELY THINK THAT WOULD BE APPROPRIATE AND

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A FAIR PROVISION. BUT WHEN YOU STEP BACK A LITTLE BIT AND LOOK AT WHAT THAT REALLY MEANS IN PRACTICE, IT DOESN'T MAKE A WHOLE LOT OF SENSE.

BECAUSE WE MIGHT TALK WITH VARIOUS PEOPLE IN OUR
OFFICE WHO HAVE THE APPROPRIATE CLEARANCES, BUT ARE NOT
SUBMITTED TO THIS COURT FOR YOUR HONOR'S CONSIDERATION. WE
MAY SPEAK WITH DIFFERENT AGENTS WHO HAVE THE APPROPRIATE LEVEL
OF CLEARANCE, WHO HAVE SIGNED OFF ON 6(C) LETTERS. AND AGAIN,
THOSE INDIVIDUALS DO NOT HAVE TO BE RAISED WITH THE COURT
BECAUSE WE ALREADY HAVE OBLIGATIONS. THEY ALREADY HAVE
OBLIGATIONS.

I AGREE THAT SOMEONE OR SOME PEOPLE DID NOT FOLLOW
THEIR 6(E) OBLIGATIONS IN THIS CASE. THEY REPREHENSIBLY
VIOLATED THOSE OBLIGATIONS. BUT WE STILL HAVE PROCEDURES IN
PLACE. WE STILL HAVE RESTRICTIONS IN PLACE.

AND REGARDING CLASSIFIED INFORMATION, YOUR HONOR, WE KNOW WHAT WE'RE SUPPOSED TO -- HOW WE'RE SUPPOSED TO HANDLE IT. THE DEFENSE NOW KNOWS HOW THEY'RE SUPPOSED TO HANDLE IT. BUT TO ASK US TO GO TO THE COURT EVERY TIME A PERSON WITH TOP SECRET CLEARANCE IN OUR OFFICE IS CONSULTED ON AN ISSUE, I THINK THAT'S JUST GOING TOO FAR, AND I DON'T THINK IT'S NECESSARY.

TO TOUCH BRIEFLY UPON MR. GERAGOS'S POINT REGARDING
HIS NEED FOR SECURITY CLEARANCE, I'M NOT GOING TO GET INTO THE
SUBSTANCE OF THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF CIPA. IT'S BEEN APPLIED

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BY THE 9TH CIRCUIT MULTIPLE TIMES, BY THE WAY. BUT I'LL WAIT FOR MR. GERAGOS'S MOTION.

THE COURT: YOU AGREE THE CONSEQUENCE IS THAT IF HE ELECTS NOT TO UNDERGO THE CLEARANCE, THAT HE'S NOT GOING TO GET THE INFORMATION?

MR. FORGE: WELL, THAT'S THE POINT I WANTED TO ADDRESS.

I DON'T THINK WE SHOULD BE SO QUICK TO THINK IT'S A BLACK-AND-WHITE DECISION ON BEHALF OF MR. GERAGOS BECAUSE I THINK THERE'S A REAL 6TH AMENDMENT ISSUE REGARDING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF HIS COUNSEL IF HE DOESN'T RECEIVE THAT INFORMATION.

WHEN YOU THINK ABOUT HIS ARGUMENT A LITTLE BIT, IT'S ALMOST AS IF HE'S SAYING, "MR. FOGGO IMPROPERLY DISCLOSED SO MUCH CLASSIFIED INFORMATION TO MY CLIENT, AND MY CLIENT HAS THEN DISCLOSED ALL OF THAT CLASSIFIED INFORMATION TO ME, I DON'T NEED ANYMORE INFORMATION. I HAVE ENOUGH."

WELL, YOUR HONOR, FIRST OF ALL, THERE IS INFORMATION
THAT WE BELIEVE MR. FOGGO DOESN'T HAVE, CLASSIFIED INFORMATION
IN THIS CASE THAT WE WILL BE DISCLOSING IN DISCOVERY. I THINK
THAT INFORMATION TOUCHES UPON SUBJECT MATTERS OF WHICH
MR. FOGGO IS AWARE. HIS INFORMATION CERTAINLY FELL WITHIN THE
CLASSIFICATION LEVEL THAT HE HAD AT ONE TIME.

BUT THERE ARE E-MAILS AND THERE ARE DOCUMENTS THAT

IT IS OUR BELIEF THAT HE HAS NEVER SEEN BEFORE THAT WE WISH TO

DISCLOSE TO HIM AND DISCLOSE TO MR. WILKES UNDER THE RIGHT
CIRCUMSTANCES. AND I JUST THINK THAT THERE IS -- WE'LL
ADDRESS IT IF AND WHEN MR. GERAGOS PUTS THE QUESTION OF

WHETHER HE WANTS TO PUT IN FOR SECURITY CLEARANCE.

- I DON'T THINK WE SHOULD ASSUME THAT ULTIMATELY IT'S
 HIS DECISION. ULTIMATELY, IT'S THE COURT'S DECISION AS TO
 WHETHER OR NOT MR. GERAGOS WILL BE ABLE TO RENDER EFFECTIVE
 ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL WITHOUT THIS INFORMATION. I DON'T THINK
 HE COULD.
- THE COURT: HAVE YOU STARTED THE PROCESS YET,

 MR. GERAGOS, ARE HAVE YOU REFRAINED FROM FILLING OUT THE FORMS

 AND LETTING THE PROCESS BEGIN?
- MR. GERAGOS: I HAVE NOT. MR. LONDERGAN HAD CALLED

 ME. HE INDICATED THAT IN ORDER TO RECEIVE THE INFORMATION, I

 HAD TO DO IT. I TOLD HIM, I THINK, POLITELY "I RESIST THAT."

 HE SAID WE COULD BRING IT UP IN COURT. THAT'S WHAT

 I'VE DONE.
- THE COURT: IF YOU'RE INTENT ON BRINGING A MOTION CHALLENGING THE PROVISIONS OF CIPA, WE'D BETTER DO THAT IN FAIRLY QUICK ORDER.
- MR. GERAGOS: I INTEND ON DOING THAT. I APOLOGIZE

 TO THE COURT. I'VE BEEN IN TRIAL UNTIL LAST FRIDAY. MY

 CO-COUNSEL, MR. BUEHLER, IS IN A CAPITAL CASE IN FEDERAL COURT

 IN THE CENTRAL DISTRICT RIGHT NOW. I'M OUT, THOUGH. SO I CAN

 GET IT DONE FAIRLY QUICKLY.

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THE COURT: I'M MINDFUL WHEN YOU WERE HERE THE FIRST
TIME, YOU SAID THAT MR. WILKES MAY WANT HIS TRIAL WITHIN
70 DAYS.

MR. GERAGOS: THAT'S CORRECT.

THE COURT: I'M PREPARED TO GIVE HIM THAT SUBJECT TO
THE EXEMPTIONS UNDER THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT, IF WE NEED TO GET
THIS NAILED DOWN RIGHT AWAY BECAUSE THERE ARE QUESTIONS BEYOND
JUST WHETHER YOU WANT TO ACCEDE TO THIS PROCEDURE OR NOT, AS
MR. FORGE RAISED IT. SO I WANT YOU TO FILE THAT MOTION
IMMEDIATELY.

MR. GERAGOS: I WILL DO THAT.

THE COURT: GO AHEAD, MR. FORGE.

MR. PITOFSKY: WE'RE HAVING A LITTLE PROBLEM HEARING
THE COURT.

THE COURT: I'M SORRY. I'VE JUST TOLD MR. GERAGOS
THAT IF HE INTENDS TO CHALLENGE THE CIPA PROVISIONS, BRING
CONSTITUTIONAL OR OTHER CHALLENGE TO THEM, THAT HE NEEDS TO DO
THAT RIGHT AWAY. WE NEED TO GET NAILED DOWN WHETHER HE'S
GOING TO BE SUBJECT TO THAT AND WHETHER THE COURT WILL PERMIT
HIM TO MAKE THE ELECTION THAT HE'S TALKED ABOUT; THAT IS, THAT
HE'S NOT TO GO THROUGH THE SECURITY CLEARANCE. I'LL RESERVE
ON THAT UNTIL SUCH TIME I SEE HIS MOTION CHALLENGING THE CIPA
PROVISION.

MR. PITOFSKY: THANK YOU.

MR. FORGE: I JUST WANT TO WRAP IT UP WHERE I BEGAN,

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AND THAT IS WITH THE LEAKS AND THE PROPER WAY OF ADDRESSING
THOSE LEAKS AND DOING THE BEST THAT WE CAN SO THE COURT STANDS
ASSURED THAT THEY DON'T HAPPEN IN THE FUTURE.

I THINK AS POINTED OUT, WHEN YOU GO ONE BY ONE
THROUGH THE REQUESTS FOR RECIPROCAL PROVISIONS IN THE
PROTECTIVE ORDER, THAT'S NOT THE RIGHT WAY TO GO ABOUT IT.
HOWEVER -- ALSO, YOUR HONOR, I THINK IF WE BURY IT IN A CIPA
PROTECTIVE ORDER, THAT'S NOT, I DON'T THINK, THE MESSAGE THE
COURT WANTS TO SEND.

WHAT I WOULD INVITE THE COURT TO DO IS TO ISSUE A
SEPARATE ORDER RESTRICTING THE DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION BY
ALL PARTIES AND REMINDING ALL PARTIES -- AND YOUR HONOR DOES
NOT MISS WORDS. IF YOUR HONOR CHOOSES TO ADDRESS THE LEAKS OF
INFORMATION, SO BE IT. THEY CERTAINLY WEREN'T FROM THE
DEFENSE, AT LEAST BASED ON THE PRESS ACCOUNTS.

THAT, I THINK, YOUR HONOR, WOULD SEND A VERY STRONG
MESSAGE TO WHOEVER THE INDIVIDUAL OR INDIVIDUALS WERE WHO
LEAKED THIS INFORMATION. AND I THINK IT WOULD KEEP THAT
PORTION OF THIS COURT'S VIEWS IN THE PROPER CONTEXT.

I DON'T THINK IT'S INTERTWINED WITH CIPA. I THINK
IT'S A SEPARATE ISSUE, A VERY SERIOUS ISSUE, BUT A SEPARATE
ISSUE THAT IS BEST HANDLED IN THE CONTEXT OF A DIFFERENT
ORDER.

THE COURT: I HAVE A QUESTION ABOUT YOUR

CHARACTERIZATION OF MR. LONDERGAN AS BEING A REPRESENTATIVE OF

THE EXECUTIVE. HERE I DON'T VIEW HIS FUNCTION AS BEING A
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE EXECUTIVE. I'VE APPOINTED HIM AS COURT
SECURITY OFFICER. I REALLY SEE HIS FUNCTION AS A
OUASI-JUDICIAL FUNCTION.

HE IS RESPONSIBLE FOR IMPLEMENTING THE CIPA
PROVISIONS USING HIS BEST JUDGMENT. HE WORKS UNDER THE
AUSPICES OF THE COURT. SO I DON'T SEE HIM IN HIS ROLE AS A
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE EXECUTIVE IN THIS CASE. I SEE HIM AS
SORT OF AN OMBUDSMAN FOR THIS CLASSIFIED INFORMATION, AND HE'S
TO ADVISE ME ABOUT THE PROPER PROCEDURES.

DO YOU AGREE WITH THAT?

MR. FORGE: I DO, YOUR HONOR. MY POINT IS THAT

MR. LONDERGAN IS A MEMBER OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH. I AGREE

WITH YOU THAT HE IS STRADDLING THE LINE BETWEEN THE TWO

BRANCHES. I AGREE, HE IS MORE IN THE ROLE OF AN OMBUDSMAN.

THE COURT: THAT BEING SO, MR. LONDERGAN, I'D LIKE
TO HEAR YOUR POINT OF VIEW ON THE DEFENSE POSITION HERE. I
HAVE SOME QUESTION -- IF YOU'LL APPROACH THE LECTERN. I HAVE
SOME QUESTION ABOUT THE PRACTICALITY OF IMPOSING ON THE
GOVERNMENT THE OBLIGATION OF GOING THROUGH YOU BEFORE LOOKING
AT THE MATERIALS. AFTER ALL, YOU AND I HAD A DISCUSSION.

AND FOR THE EDIFICATION OF COUNSEL, BECAUSE I'M
SUBJECT TO THESE PROVISIONS AS WELL, IT WAS WHETHER A SKIP WAS
GOING TO BE INSTALLED IN MY CHAMBERS AND A SAFE. AND I
ELECTED NOT TO DO THAT. I SAID, "I'LL GO OVER TO THE

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GOVERNMENT'S SECURE FACILITY." MR. LONDERGAN TOLD ME HE'D

ALREADY INSPECTED IT AND KNEW THAT IT EXISTED AND IT COMPLIED

WITH THE PROVISIONS. I SAID, "IF I NEED TO LOOK AT THIS

STUFF, THEN I'LL GO OVER THERE RATHER THAN HAVE THIS CAPITAL

EXPENSE HERE."

YOU'RE FAMILIAR WITH THEIR SHOP. THE PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF REQUIRING THEM TO GO THROUGH YOU TO LOOK AT THINGS THAT ARE UNDER THEIR LOCK AND KEY DON'T MAKE MUCH SENSE, BUT I AM CONCERNED. THE GIST OF THIS MOTION, AS I UNDERSTAND IT, THE GENESIS IS THAT DEFENSE COUNSEL ARE RIGHTLY CONCERNED ABOUT LEAKING, AND THEY'RE WORRIED ABOUT, I THINK, AMONG OTHER THINGS, LEAKING OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.

THERE'S BEEN LEAKING SO FAR. IT'S BEEN PREJUDICIAL, I THINK, TO THE DEFENDANTS.

I DON'T CONDONE TRYING THE CASE IN THE PRESS OR FORECASTING EVEN BEFORE DEFENSE COUNSEL AND THE DEFENDANTS KNOW TO THE PRESS AND THE PUBLIC WHAT'S GOING TO HAPPEN. THAT SHOULDN'T HAVE BEEN DONE. AND I THINK THEY HAVE A JUSTIFIED CONCERN THAT GIVEN THE NATURE OF THE INFORMATION HERE, THAT THERE OUGHT TO BE SOME RECIPROCAL RESTRICTIONS ON BOTH SIDES.

THAT'S WHAT I'D LIKE TO ADDRESS. I AGREE WITH

MR. FORGE. I CAN DO THAT ON A STAND-ALONE BASIS. I'M

PREPARED TO DO THAT. I THINK THAT THERE'S ALSO SOME

APPLICATION OF CIPA PROVISIONS THAT WOULD CONTROL THAT. AND

IF THERE'S ANOTHER LEAK, MAKE THE PERSON LEAKING SUBJECT TO

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SANCTIONS IN ANY NUMBER OF WAYS.

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I'M INTERESTED IN YOUR VIEW ON THIS PROPOSAL THAT
THE DEFENSE IS MADE TO MAKE ALL THESE PROVISIONS RECIPROCAL.

MR. LONDERGAN: FIRST OF ALL, I WORK AS A NEUTRAL OFFICER OF THE COURT. I'M PAID BY THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH, NOMINATED TO THE COURT UNDER CIPA. ONCE THE NOMINATION IS ACCEPTED, THE COURT ISSUES AN ORDER, WHICH THE COURT HAS DONE. THAT GIVES ME THE STATUS AS A NEUTRAL PERSON REPORTING TO THE JUDGE ANY PROBLEMS IN TERMS OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION FROM A SECURITY POINT OF VIEW THAT MAY ARISE.

UNDER CIPA, YOUR HONOR, IT DISTINCTLY SEPARATES

CERTAIN PROCEDURES, CIPA AND ALSO THE SECURITY PROCEDURES,

WHICH MUST BE UPHELD BY THE DEFENSE AND BY THE GOVERNMENT.

AND WITHIN CIPA, THE DEFENSE IS REQUIRED TO FILE UNDER SEAL

UNTIL THERE'S A REVIEW MADE IN TERMS OF DETERMINATION OF

CLASSIFIABILITY OF THE INFORMATION THAT THEY WERE PROFFERING

TO THE COURT.

ONCE THAT'S DONE UNDER CIPA, THAT REVIEW CAN BE DONE
IN CONJUNCTION WITH EITHER ME AND REPRESENTATIVES OF THE
PARTICULAR AGENCIES OR IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE GOVERNMENT, WHO
ALSO IS DEALING WITH THE AGENCIES, WHO WOULD BE THE
CLASSIFYING AGENCIES FOR THE MATERIAL.

THE GOVERNMENT -- BECAUSE THE CLASSIFICATION IS AN EXECUTIVE BRANCH DETERMINATION, THE GOVERNMENT IS IN THE POSITION OF THE POWER TO DETERMINE WHAT IS CLASSIFIED AND WHAT

IS NOT CLASSIFIED. THEREFORE, THEY DON'T HAVE THE PROTECTION 1 2 OR THE INSURANCE PROTECTION, AS SUCH, OF GOING THROUGH ME VIA 3 THAT PROCESS. THEY OPERATE AT THEIR OWN RISK IN TERMS OF 4 FILING OPENLY OR FILING UNDER SEAL WHAT IS CLASSIFIED. 5 THE COURT: SO YOUR VIEW IS THE GIST OF THIS 6 PROVISION IS CONTROLLING ONLY ON THE DEFENSE AND THEIR 7 FILINGS? 8 MR. LONDERGAN: UNDER THE ACT ITSELF, THE ACT AND 9 THE SECURITY PROCEDURES. 10 THE COURT: WHAT PROVISION IS THERE IN CIPA, IF ANY, 11 THAT ALLOWS ME TO ISSUE A FAIRLY STRICT NON-DISCLOSURE ORDER 12 TO BOTH SIDES? I MEAN, I THINK I HAVE INHERENT POWER TO DO 13 THAT. 14 MR. LONDERGAN: I THINK YOU DO, SIR. 15 THE COURT: IS THERE A PROVISION IN CIPA? 16 MR. LONDERGAN: I DON'T KNOW OF ANY LIMITATIONS. 17 THE COURT: WELL, YOU'VE VIEWED THE SKIP AND THE 18 VAULT AND ALL THE PRECAUTIONS THAT THE U.S. ATTORNEY HAS IN 19 PLACE? 20 MR. LONDERGAN: THE SKIP IN THE U.S. ATTORNEY'S 21 OFFICE HAD BEEN ACCREDITED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 22 SPECIAL SECURITY OFFICER, THE NUMBER ONE PERSON IN THE 23 DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE WHO DOES THIS PARTICULAR FUNCTION, AS 2.4 HAD BEEN THE FACILITY IN LOS ANGELES. 25 THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. ANYTHING ELSE I SHOULD KNOW,

MR. LONDERGAN, FROM YOUR POINT OF VIEW? 1 2 MR. LONDERGAN: NO, SIR. IN TERMS OF MR. GERAGOS, 3 WHEN WE SPOKE, IT WAS MORE IN THE CONTEXT OF MR. GERAGOS WAS 4 GOING TO CONSIDER WHETHER HE WOULD BE APPLYING FOR A SECURITY 5 CLEARANCE. 6 THE COURT: YOU AGREE OR ACCEPT THAT THE CONSEQUENCE 7 IS IF I UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OR ANY OTHER CHALLENGE TO 8 THE STATUTE, THAT HE MUST GO THROUGH THAT OR FOREGO USE OF 9 CLASSIFIED MATERIALS? 10 MR. LONDERGAN: THAT MIGHT BE STEPPING A LITTLE BIT 11 OUTSIDE OF MY REALM. 12 THE COURT: HAVE YOU EVER HAD A SITUATION WHERE 13 COUNSEL HAS ELECTED TO WAIVE ENTITLEMENT TO CONFIDENTIAL 14 MATERIAL BECAUSE THEY DIDN'T WANT TO GO THROUGH THE 15 PROCEDURES? 16 MR. LONDERGAN: I'M SURE THERE HAS BEEN AN INSTANCE. 17 IT WAS AN AWFUL LONG TIME AGO. THAT PARTICULAR COUNSEL HAD --18 DEFENSE COUNSEL HAD A PRIOR RELATIONSHIP WITH A CERTAIN UNITED 19 STATES GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION. SO BASED ON THAT RELATIONSHIP 20 AND PREVIOUS LITIGATIONS. 21 THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. THANK YOU, MR. LONDERGAN. 22 MR. GERAGOS, HERE'S THE PROBLEM I SEE. 23 ENTERTAIN ANY CHALLENGE YOU WANT TO BRING. BUT LOOK, THE 2.4 NATURE OF WHAT'S AT ISSUE AND WHAT'S CONTESTED HERE IS

CLASSIFIED INFORMATION. SO WHETHER YOU KNOW THAT SOMEHOW

1 INDEPENDENTLY OR BECAUSE YOU GOT IT FROM THE UNITED STATES, I
2 THINK THE PROVISIONS STILL APPLY TO YOU.

THE WHOLE PURPOSE BEHIND THE CIPA THING IS FOR ME TO HEAR FROM THE GOVERNMENT THAT CERTAIN THINGS SHOULD NOT BE AIRED AND TO EVALUATE WHETHER THOSE THINGS NEED TO BE AIRED IN ORDER TO FAIRLY DEFEND THE DEFENDANT, MAKE A JUDGMENT ABOUT THAT. IF I CONCLUDE THAT THEY SHOULD NOT, THEN I WOULD ORDER THEM NOT DISCLOSED.

I HAVE A FEELING THAT THE POSITION YOU'RE ADVOCATING GIVES GREAT PAUSE TO THE UNITED STATES. THEY'RE FEARFUL THAT WHILE YOU MAY HAVE GOTTEN SOME OF THIS INFORMATION IN AN UNAUTHORIZED FASHION, THAT THAT STILL DOESN'T ENTITLE YOU -- AND BY "UNAUTHORIZED," I MEAN YOUR CLIENT GOT IT IN AN UNAUTHORIZED WAY AND TOLD YOU. I DON'T MEAN ANYTHING UNTOWARD ON YOUR PART.

BUT I THINK THEIR POSITION IS STILL GOING TO BE "WE DON'T CARE HOW HE GOT IT. IF IT'S CLASSIFIED INFORMATION THAT YOU DETERMINE NOT TO BE RELEVANT TO THE DEFENSE, THEN IT'S NOT GOING TO BE BROUGHT UP BY ANYONE."

ISN'T THAT YOUR POSITION? YOU THINK THAT

MR. GERAGOS, LIKE IT OR NOT, IS SUBJECT AT LEAST TO THOSE

PROVISIONS OF CIPA THAT HAVE THE COURT EVALUATE THE NATIONAL

SECURITY INTEREST VERSUS THE RELEVANCY?

MR. FORGE: YES, YOUR HONOR. THERE ARE ALSO
STATUTES BEYOND CIPA THAT RESTRICT ANYONE'S DISCLOSURE OF

CLASSIFIED INFORMATION. SO IT'S NOT JUST A CIPA ISSUE. THERE

ARE SPECIFIC STATUTES DEALING WITH IT.

THE COURT: I WANT YOU TO ADDRESS THAT AS WELL. NOT JUST YOUR AS-APPLIED CHALLENGE TO THIS STATUTE. LET'S ASSUME I RULE THAT THE STATUTE IS OKAY. I'M NOT SURE YOU HAVE THE LATITUDE TO DO WHAT YOU THINK EVEN IF YOU MAKE THE ELECTION.

MR. GERAGOS: I THINK THAT THE PROBLEM IS THERE'S A 6TH AMENDMENT PROBLEM. SO I THINK THAT TRUMPS ANYTHING THAT'S IN CIPA, ANY OTHER CLASSIFICATION THAT THEY HAVE. I THINK THAT MY DUTY TO ZEALOUSLY DEFEND MY CLIENT IN THE BEST WAY POSSIBLE AND MY RIGHT TO CROSS-EXAMINE IN A WAY THAT I THINK IS APPROPRIATE, I DON'T THINK THAT I NEED TO VENT. THAT WILL BE SUBJECT, OBVIOUSLY, TO THE MOTION.

I THINK CIPA ALREADY ANTICIPATED YOU DON'T HAVE TO GET CLEARANCE FOR JURORS. JURORS ARE HERE AND THEY DON'T NEED THE CLEARANCE, I DON'T -- AND THERE ARE PROVISIONS -- I'LL PUT THIS IN THE MOTION AS WELL -- THAT INDICATE THAT IF THE INFORMATION WAS PREVIOUSLY GLOBAL POSSESSION, YOU CAN'T DO ANYTHING ABOUT PUTTING THE HORSE BACK IN THE BARN.

THE COURT: THERE MAY BE NO PROVISION WHERE I CAN FORCE YOU TO UNDERGO THIS SCREENING AND ALL. I UNDERSTAND YOUR LEGAL POSITION ON THAT. I'M CONCERNED ABOUT THE BROADER IMPLICATIONS; THAT DEFENDANTS BAR THE DOOR, AND THAT WHATEVER YOU KNOW YOU CAN CROSS-EXAMINE ON. IF THAT'S THE CASE, THEN MR. FOGGO WOULDN'T NEED TO HAVE THIS EITHER. HE CAN SAY, "I

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ELECT NOT TO HAVE IT. I ALREADY KNOW EVERYTHING I NEED TO KNOW."

MR. GERAGOS: I THINK THERE'S A QUALITATIVE

DIFFERENCE. MR. FOGGO IS IN A SITUATION WHERE HE HAD, AS WAS

INDICATED, A PRIOR CONTRACT. AND HE HAD -- AS PART OF HIS

DUTIES IN THE CIA, HE HAD TO GO THROUGH A CERTAIN KIND OF -
OATHS AND EVERYTHING ELSE AND CONTRACTS. SO HE'S IN A VERY

DIFFERENT POSITION.

MY CLIENT IS NOT. MY CLIENT WAS A CONTRACTOR. MY CLIENT, IN THE COURSE AND SCOPE OF HIS CONTRACTING, KNOWS THE INFORMATION WITHOUT A SECURITY CLEARANCE AND NOT NECESSARILY FROM MR. FOGGO. SO I WANT THAT TO BE CLEAR.

THEREFORE, WHEN THAT'S COMMUNICATED TO ME, IT'S NOT SO MUCH THE SECURITY CLEARANCE THAT I OBJECT TO, EVEN THOUGH I HAVE A PROBLEM WITH THE DOJ DOING ANYTHING, TELLING MY CLIENT WHO HIS LAWYER CAN AND CAN'T BE. IT IRKS ME. I DON'T KNOW THAT THE IRKSOME BASIS IS SUFFICIENT TO DECLARE THAT UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

I HAVE A PROBLEM WITH THE SECTION 5 AND THE OTHER PROVISIONS THAT SAY THAT I'VE GOT TO VENT CERTAIN THINGS AND THAT I'VE GOT TO COME HERE AND I'VE GOT TO GIVE THEM A PREVIEW OF WHAT MY CROSS-EXAMINATION IS GOING TO BE. I TAKE GREAT UMBRAGE AT THAT AND THINK THAT THAT'S A 6TH AMENDMENT VIOLATION. I DON'T THINK ANYTHING THAT THEY'VE GOT IS GOING TO TRUMP THE 6TH AMENDMENT.

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1	THE COURT: THAT SHOULD BE PART OF YOUR MOTION, TOO,
2	THEN. I WANT TO RESOLVE THAT AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE DATE.
3	WHAT DATE HAVE WE SET FOR SUBSTANTIVE MOTIONS?
4	MR. GERAGOS: APRIL 2ND BY 2:00.
5	THE COURT: YOU'RE PREPARED
6	MR. HALPERN: APRIL 2ND IS DISCOVERY MOTIONS.
7	THE COURT: I THINK THIS IMPACTS ON YOUR DESIRE THAT
8	YOU STATED INITIALLY AND THEN REITERATED TODAY FOR A SPEEDY
9	TRIAL. I THINK YOU SHOULD FILE THIS MOTION AS SOON
10	AS YOU CAN. THE TIME SCHEDULE IS THREE WEEKS BEFORE HEARING,
11	AND THE GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSE IS DUE A WEEK IN ADVANCE.
12	I'M NOT GOING TO PRESUME TO GIVE ANY KIND OF
13	TENTATIVE INDICATION UNTIL I READ THE PAPERS. I THINK YOU
14	SHOULD INCLUDE ALL OF THESE CONCERNS THAT YOU'VE RAISED TODAY
15	IN YOUR MOTION AND LET ME DECIDE THOSE, AND WE'LL SEE WHERE WE
16	GO FROM THERE.
17	MR. GERAGOS: COULD I ALSO ADDRESS ONE OTHER AREA,
18	WHICH IS THE LEAKS AND THE IDEA OF THE STAND-ALONE ORDER.
19	I HAD SUGGESTED IN A LETTER PRIOR TO MY CLIENT'S
20	INDICTMENT, BECAUSE I WAS SO IRATE AT THE TIME AND I'VE
21	MENTIONED BEFORE, THAT I WANTED ALL OF THE PEOPLE ON THE
22	PROSECUTION TEAM, HOWEVER WE WANT TO DEFINE THAT, TO FILE
23	DECLARATIONS UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY.
24	I'D SUGGESTED AT THE TIME SINCE JUDGE GONZALEZ WAS
25	THE ONE WHO WAS HANDLING THE SPECIAL MASTER PROCEEDINGS THAT

IT BE PRESENTED TO HER. I THINK IT'S APPROPRIATE -- IF THE COURT WANTS, I WILL FILE A MOTION WITH THE REQUEST -- THAT THAT BE DONE AND THE COURT APPOINT SOMEONE TO DO AN INVESTIGATION.

AS THIS COURT WELL KNOWS, THE SOURCE PRIVILEGE IS

NOT MET WITH A WHOLE LOT OF SUCCESS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS

ANYMORE. UNFORTUNATELY, IN THE STATE COURTS IT'S STILL THERE,

AND YOU CAN'T GET TO THE BOTTOM OF THIS. HERE WE CAN GET TO

THE BOTTOM OF THIS. CLEARLY, AS THEY'VE CONCEDED, IT DID NOT

COME FROM THE DEFENSE. I THINK IT POTENTIALLY IS BRADY OR

GIGLIO INFORMATION AS TO WHO IT IS WHO WILLINGLY WILL GO OUT

AND VIOLATE 6(E).

AND THE WAY TO FIND THAT OUT IS TO GET THESE PEOPLE
TO PUT THEIR DECLARATIONS UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY AND BRING
IN THE REPORTERS AND PUT THEM UNDER OATH AND LET THEM SAY WHO
IT WAS WHO DISCLOSED THE INFORMATION.

THE COURT: YOU CAN BRING THAT MOTION. I HAVE A LOT ON MY PLATE ALREADY. I DON'T KNOW IF I WANT TO UNDERTAKE ANOTHER CASE AT THIS POINT.

MR. TESLIK, ANYTHING MORE?

MR. TESLIK: JUST BRIEFLY.

JUST FOR THE RECORD, WE LEARNED THE DETAILS OF THE INDICTMENT FROM A TELEPHONE CALL FROM A REPORTER BEFORE THE INDICTMENT WAS RETURNED AS WELL. WE DIDN'T PUT THAT IN OUR MOTION. BUT GIVEN THE NATURE OF THE REPRESENTATIONS AND THE

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COURT'S CONCERNS HERE ABOUT 6(E), I THINK IT'S IMPORTANT THAT

THE RECORD REFLECT THAT WE GOT THE SAME TELEPHONE CALL AS

MR. GERAGOS.

YOUR HONOR, IT APPEARS, FROM WHAT MR. LONDERGAN HAS SAID AND WHAT THE GOVERNMENT HAS SAID, THAT THE GOVERNMENT IS IN -- APPEARS TO BE OR IS REPRESENTING TO THE COURT THAT IT IS IN COMPLIANCE WITH MOST OF THE SECURITY PROCEDURES. THAT WOULD MAKE THE RECIPROCAL PROCEDURES THAT WE ASK THAT THE COURT IMPOSE UNDER THE CIPA MOTION VERY EASY TO COMPLY WITH.

IT APPEARS THAT MR. LONDERGAN HAS ALREADY SEEN THE SKIP OVER AT THE U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE. SO WHAT WE'RE ASKING BE INCLUDED IN THE CIPA ORDER SEEMS TO BE SOMETHING THAT THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD READILY AGREE TO BECAUSE IT APPEARS THAT THEY'RE ALREADY IN THE COMPLIANCE THAT WE SEE.

THE COURT: HERE'S THE PROBLEM I HAVE: AS

MR. LONDERGAN POINTS OUT, CIPA IS DIRECTED AT ACTIONS BY

DEFENSE COUNSEL AND AVOIDING THE WHOLE PROBLEM WITH GRAY

MAILING AND SETTING SOME PROCEDURES SO THAT THAT DOESN'T

OCCUR.

THE OTHER SALIENT POINT IS THAT THE GOVERNMENT, IN
THE FIRST INSTANCE, DECIDES THE CLASSIFICATION LEVEL. SO ONE
WOULD THINK IF THEY'RE ENTRUSTED WITH THAT AUTHORITY, THEN
THEY'RE GOING TO OBSERVE THE CLASSIFICATION LEVELS THEMSELVES.

I'M RELUCTANT, ON A TACTICAL BASIS, BECAUSE I KNOW
YOU DON'T ORDINARILY HAVE A SKIP. YOU DON'T HAVE TO DEAL WITH

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INFORMATION YOU GET FROM CLIENTS ON THAT BASIS. IT'S THE PECULIAR NATURE OF WHAT'S INVOLVED HERE THAT REQUIRES

DIFFERENT PROCEDURE IN THIS CASE THAT YOU HAVE TO FOLLOW.

I'M RELUCTANT TO IMPOSE CONDITIONS ON THEM THAT
THEY'VE ALREADY IMPOSED UPON THEMSELVES, PARTICULARLY WHEN
CIPA DOESN'T PARTICULARLY AUTHORIZE ME TO DO THAT. I THINK I
CAN GET TO THE GIST OF THE PROBLEM THAT YOU AND MR. GERAGOS
HAVE RAISED WITH RESPECT TO LEAKS BY ISSUING A STAND-ALONE
ORDER. I'M PREPARED TO DO THAT. MR. GERAGOS SAYS HE'S GOING
TO FILE A MOTION FOR SOME FURTHER RELIEF.

LOOK, I THINK IT'S A BIG PROBLEM. AND I THINK
MR. FORGE AND MR. HALPERN HAVE ACKNOWLEDGED IT. IF THEY HAVE
SOMEBODY THAT'S LEAKING GRAND JURY INFORMATION, WHY WOULD YOU
ASSUME THAT THEY WOULDN'T ALSO LEAK A TITILLATING BIT OF
CLASSIFIED INFORMATION THAT COULD SERVE THEIR ENDS. THAT
SHOULDN'T HAPPEN. THE FIRST THING SHOULDN'T HAVE HAPPENED,
THAT THAT CERTAINLY SHOULDN'T HAPPEN.

I IMAGINE THEY'VE BEEN PRETTY DEFT IN RESPONDING.

IMAGINE THAT THERE'S PROBABLY AN INVESTIGATION UNDERWAY

ALREADY AND THEY'RE SCURRYING TO STOP WHATEVER LEAKING HAS

OCCURRED. I THINK I CURE THAT PROBLEM BY ISSUING A

STAND-ALONE ORDER.

I'LL ENTERTAIN PROPOSED ORDERS FROM THE THREE OF
YOU, MR. GERAGOS AND MR. TESLIK AND THEN THE GOVERNMENT.
WHATEVER PROPOSED ORDER YOU THINK IS APPROPRIATE TO COVER THE

CONCERN RAISED BY THE DEFENSE MOTION, I'LL LOOK AT THEM. 1 2 MAYBE YOU CAN AGREE ON A STIPULATED ORDER AND I'LL SIGN THAT. 3 BUT I THINK CERTAINLY THAT THAT OUGHT TO APPLY RECIPROCALLY. 4 THE PROOF'S IN THE PUDDING, MR. FORGE. I THINK AS 5 COUNSEL FOR THESE DEFENDANTS AND AS AMERICAN MEMBERS OF THE 6 PUBLIC, THESE TWO FELLOWS HAVE A RIGHT TO BE PRETTY OUTRAGED 7 AT WHAT'S HAPPENED SO FAR. THEY'RE CONCERNED THAT IT OUGHT 8 NOT TO HAPPEN ANYMORE. 9 MR. FORGE: THEY CERTAINLY HAVE THAT RIGHT. 10 THE COURT: I'LL SIGN AN ORDER, BUT I THINK THAT 11 ANSWERS THAT. 12 AS FAR AS THE OTHER PROVISIONS YOU SET FORTH AT 4 THROUGH 5, I THINK ALL OF THAT -- IT WOULD BE SUPERFLUOUS FOR 13 14 ME TO AMEND THE PROTECTIVE ORDER TO REQUIRE THAT. THEY'RE 15 DOING THAT ANYWAY. 16 YOUR NOTES, TO THE EXTENT THEY IMPLICATE 17 CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION, I ASSUME THAT YOU'RE FOLLOWING THE 18 PROCEDURE AND KEEPING THOSE NOTES --19 MR. FORGE: WE HAVE TO GO INTO THE SKIP, OPEN THE 20 DOOR OF THE SKIP --21 THE COURT: I'M CONCERNED, MR. TESLIK, ALSO, THAT I 22 SAY, "OKAY. TELL ME WHO YOU'RE REPORTING THE INFORMATION TO." 23 I'M DEALING WITH THE BRANCH OF THE EXECUTIVE. AND THEY'RE THE 2.4 ONES, AFTER ALL, THAT HAVE THIS CONCERN ABOUT TOP SECRET 25 CLEARANCES. IT'S THEIR REPRESENTATIVES WHO MAKE THE

DETERMINATION WHETHER SOMEBODY IS WORTHY OF THAT KIND OF
CLEARANCE THEY'VE MADE IT AS TO THESE FELLOWS AND PRESUMABLY
WHO THEY'RE TALKING TO ABOUT IT.

YOU KNOW THE PROCEDURES THEY GO THROUGH; TRIAL TEAM MEETINGS, INDICTMENT REVIEW. TO HAVE THEM HAVE TO REPORT TO ME ON ALL OF THOSE INTERACTIONS WITH CAREER MEMBERS OF THE U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, I JUST THINK IT'S SUPERFLUOUS. I DON'T THINK I NEED TO LOOK AT THAT.

IT'S A DIFFERENT STORY IF YOU WANT TO CONSULT WITH SOME EXPERT OR SOMEBODY OUTSIDE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION IS IMPLICATED. THEN I DO HAVE A CONCERN. BUT THOSE ARE PRACTICAL DIFFERENCES, I THINK. AND SENSIBLY, I THINK, CIPA DOESN'T EXTEND EVERYBODY THE U.S. ATTORNEY WANTS TO CONSULT ON THIS.

SO THE MOTION TO MODIFY IS DENIED EXCEPT INSOFAR AS THE RECIPROCAL PROVISIONS REGARDING KEEPING SECRET THIS INFORMATION. AND PERHAPS NOT UNDER THE AUSPICES OF CIPA, BUT UNDER THE INHERENT POWER OF THE COURT, I WILL SIGN AN ORDER THAT APPLIES TO ANYONE TO WHOM THE INFORMATION IS DISSEMINATED OR ANYONE WHO'S HAD ANY PART OF THE INVESTIGATION, WHETHER WITH THE GOVERNMENT OR ON THE OTHER SIDE REPRESENTING THE DEFENDANTS, THAT THEY NOT DISCLOSE ANY MORE INFORMATION ABOUT THIS, THAT THE DISCLOSURE PROVISIONS THAT CIPA PROVIDES FOR RUNNING THINGS THROUGH MR. LONDERGAN THAT ARE CLASSIFIED APPLY TO EVERYONE ON BOTH SIDES.

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SO DRAFT AN APPROPRIATE ORDER. GET TOGETHER AND GIVE ME A STIPULATED ORDER, IF YOU CAN REACH ONE. OTHERWISE, GIVE ME YOUR COMPETING VERSIONS, AND I'LL EITHER HARMONIZE THEM OR CHOOSE BETWEEN THEM AND SIGN SUCH AN ORDER.

LET ME DEAL WITH THE OTHER PROVISION.

THE "EYES ONLY" PROVISION, I'M GOING TO GRANT THE MODIFICATION SOUGHT BY DEFENDANT FOGGO IN THAT CASE. JUST AS I TRIED TO BE PRACTICAL IN RULING ON THE FIRST ONE -- LOOK, MR. FORGE, I DON'T PRESUME TO KNOW EVERYTHING YOU'RE GOING TO GIVE THEM, BUT I'M ASSUMING DEFENDANT FOGGO KNOWS ALL THE CLASSIFIED INFORMATION. IT'S NOT GOING TO COME AS A SECRET TO HIM. IT MAKES LITTLE SENSE TO HAVE THE DEFENSE COME BACK TO ME AND SAY "WE WANT TO DISCUSS THIS WITH OUR CLIENT" WHEN IT'S APPARENT TO EVERYONE THAT HE ALREADY KNOWS THAT INFORMATION, UNLESS THERE'S SOMETHING I'M MISSING HERE. I CAN SEE WHERE I MIGHT DO IT DIFFERENTLY WITH MR. WILKES.

MR. FORGE: THIS IS THE POINT I TOUCHED UPON
BRIEFLY, YOUR HONOR. THERE'S CERTAINLY NOT GOING TO BE A
CATEGORY OF INFORMATION THAT DIDN'T FALL WITHIN MR. FOGGO'S
PREVIOUS SECURITY CLEARANCE, BUT THERE UNQUESTIONABLY ARE
DOCUMENTS THAT HE HAS NOT SEEN BEFORE.

WHAT I WOULD SUGGEST -- I THINK THE POINT YOU'RE

MAKING IS CERTAINLY A GOOD ONE -- IF THERE ARE INSTANCES IN

WHICH WE HAVE A GOOD FAITH BELIEF THAT MR. FOGGO HAS NEVER

SEEN THE DOCUMENT BEFORE, IN THOSE INSTANCES WHAT WE WOULD

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PREFER TO DO IS TO PRESENT THEM TO MR. TESLIK AND OTHERS IN
HIS FIRM WHO HAVE BEEN CLEARED AND EXPLAIN TO THEM WHY WE
DON'T THINK IT IS MATERIAL TO THE DEFENSE. THEY CAN EXPLAIN
TO US WHY THEY BELIEVE IT IS.

AT THAT POINT, BOTH SIDES JUST FILE THEIR PAPERS
WITH THE COURT. AT THAT POINT, IT REALLY -- IT'S NOT A MATTER
OF WHO GOES FIRST. WE'VE ATTEMPTED TO WORK IT OUT AMONGST
OURSELVES. WE DISAGREE. THE COURT NEEDS TO HEAR FROM BOTH OF
US BEFORE MAKING A DECISION.

THE COURT: THAT'S A DIFFERENT DECISION. THE

QUESTION ABOUT WHETHER THE STUFF SEES THE LIGHT OF DAY IF THE

CASE IS TRIED IS DIFFERENT FROM WHETHER THEY CAN DISCUSS IT

WITH THEIR CLIENT. WHEN I CONSIDER THE BACKGROUND HERE,

HERE'S A FELLOW THAT'S BEEN WITH THE CIA FOR 23 YEARS AND WAS

THE THIRD IN CHARGE. I CAN'T IMAGINE THAT THERE'S GOING TO BE

ANYTHING THAT -- EVEN THOUGH THIS INFORMATION MAY HAVE COME

AFTERWARDS, THERE'S NOT GOING TO BE ANYTHING THAT'S REALLY

SURPRISING TO HIM.

I JUST DON'T SEE -- I DON'T SEE THE POINT OF TELLING
THEM BEFORE THEY CAN DISCLOSE IT TO HIM IF IT'S DISPUTED, I
HAVE TO LOOK AT IT AND MAKE A RULING. I'M NOT TRYING TO SHIRK
MY RESPONSIBILITIES, BUT THERE'S SO MUCH THAT MR. FOGGO KNOWS
THAT PRESUMABLY IS GOING TO BE AT ISSUE ABOUT WHETHER THIS
GETS DISCLOSED OR DOESN'T GET DISCLOSED, IT JUST DOESN'T SEEM
TO MAKE PRACTICAL SENSE TO APPLY THE "EYES ONLY" PROVISION AS

TO OTHER MATERIAL THAT YOU CONTEMPLATE THAT HE HASN'T YET SEEN.

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MR. FORGE: JUST SO THE COURT IS CLEAR, WE'RE

TALKING ABOUT A NARROW SET OF CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH -- EITHER

WAY THE COURT IS GOING TO HAVE TO ADDRESS THE ISSUE IF THE

PARTIES CAN'T AGREE ON THE RESTRICTION OR AGREE THAT IT

SHOULDN'T BE RESTRICTED FROM MR. FOGGO LOOKING AT IT.

THE COURT: YOU'RE TALKING ABOUT I'LL HAVE TO

ADDRESS IT IN TERMS OF WHETHER MR. FOGGO GETS TO SEE IT OR

WHETHER ULTIMATELY IT CAN BE USED IN HIS DEFENSE?

MR. FORGE: WE'RE TALKING ABOUT STRICTLY THE FORM,
WHETHER MR. FOGGO GETS TO SEE IT. IF WE DON'T AGREE, THERE
MAY NOT BE INSTANCES -- IT MAY BE A SITUATION WHERE SOMETHING
OCCURRED AFTER MR. FOGGO WENT ON ADMINISTRATIVE LEAVE.

WE SAID, "LOOK, WE DON'T THINK IT'S RELEVANT. I

CAN'T IMAGINE THERE ARE ANY DEFENSES THIS WOULD RELATE TO, BUT

YOU MAY HAVE SOMETHING IN MIND. TAKE A LOOK AT THIS. LET US

KNOW IF YOU THINK IT'S RELEVANT."

AND MR. TESLIK SAYS, "I THINK THIS DOES RELATE TO SOMETHING. I WOULD LIKE TO TALK IT OVER WITH MR. FOGGO AND GET BACK TO YOU."

THE COURT: WELL, THE CONCERN IS BASICALLY YOU DON'T WANT TO ADD THE STORE OF INFORMATION THAT HE HAS WITH THINGS
THAT OCCURRED SUBSEQUENT TO HIS EMPLOYMENT?

MR. FORGE: SUBSEQUENT OR THINGS THAT WERE

OCCURRING -- THERE MAY BE WITNESS STATEMENTS.

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THE COURT: YOU KNOW WHAT, MR. TESLIK, I'M GOING TO
LEAVE THE PROTECTIVE ORDER IN PLACE. IF THIS BECOMES AN
ISSUE -- I DON'T WANT TO MAKE A HARD ONE OUT OF AN EASY ONE.
THEY SAY THEY DON'T CONTEMPLATE THAT IT'S GOING TO BE A
PROBLEM. IF IT BECOMES AN ISSUE THE FIRST TIME YOU GET AN
"EYES ONLY" THING OR IT BECOMES BURDENSOME TO YOU TO DISCUSS
IT WITH THEM AND REACH SOME ACCOMMODATION, THEN I'M GOING TO
DENY THE REQUEST FOR MODIFICATION WITHOUT PREJUDICE. BRING IT
BACK TO ME AT THAT POINT.

MR. TESLIK: YOUR HONOR, THAT RAISES ANOTHER ISSUE
THAT I DISCUSSED WITH MR. LONDERGAN BEFORE WE CAME INTO COURT
THIS MORNING.

THE GOVERNMENT, IN ITS MOTION, POINTS TO THE FACT
THAT MR. FOGGO IS NO LONGER CLEARED. NOW, HE IS STILL UNDER
CONTRACT PURSUANT TO HIS CIA SECURITY CLEARANCES THAT HE HAD
PRIOR TO HIS LEAVING THE AGENCY. I WOULD IMAGINE THAT BECAUSE
OF THE NATURE OF THAT CONTRACT, THE GOVERNMENT HAS NO PROBLEM
WITH US DISCUSSING INFORMATION WITH MR. FOGGO AT WHATEVER
LEVEL CLEARANCE WE, THE LAWYERS, OBTAIN. WE'VE BEEN OPERATING
UNDER THAT ASSUMPTION.

THE COURT: I'M ASSUMING THAT'S CORRECT, TOO.

MR. FOGGO KNOWS WHAT HE KNOWS, AND THESE FELLOWS ARE HIS

REPRESENTATIVES. I WOULD BE RELUCTANT TO ISSUE SOME ORDER

THAT WOULD IMPLICATE THEIR ATTORNEY-CLIENT COMMUNICATIONS.

MR. FORGE: I THINK THAT MR. TESLIK SHOULD ADDRESS
THAT IN A SEPARATE MOTION. IT'S A COMPLEX AREA OF THE LAW IN
TERMS OF PREEXISTING KNOWLEDGE; WHAT CAN BE DISCUSSED, WHAT
CAN'T BE DISCUSSED. THE CASES DO RECOGNIZE THAT CONTRACTUAL
OBLIGATIONS PERSIST BEYOND THE POINT OF EMPLOYMENT WITH THE
GOVERNMENT.

SO AGAIN, SPEAKING HYPOTHETICALLY, THERE ARE

CERTAINLY A WIDE RANGE OF TOPICS THAT MR. FOGGO ONCE HAD

SECURITY CLEARANCE TO DISCUSS AND TO BE EXPOSED TO THAT WOULD

BE ENTIRELY INAPPROPRIATE FOR HIM TO DISCUSS WITH MR. TESLIK

AND HIS OTHER COUNSEL BECAUSE THEY DON'T FALL WITHIN THE SCOPE

OF HIS CASE.

THE COURT: HOW DOES THAT GET ENFORCED, THOUGH? HOW DO ANY OF US KNOW WHAT MR. FOGGO AND HIS COUNSEL ARE TALKING ABOUT WHEN THEY MEET PRIVATELY TO PREPARE FOR THIS CASE?

MR. FORGE: OBVIOUSLY, WE DON'T KNOW EXACTLY WHAT THEY'RE TALKING ABOUT. WE'RE NOT TRYING TO PUT OUR EARS IN THAT ROOM AND KNOW EVERYTHING THEY'RE TALKING ABOUT.

BUT I THINK WE START, FIRST OF ALL, WITH THE SCOPE

OF THE INDICTMENT ITSELF, WHICH IS RATHER EXTENSIVE AND RATHER

DETAILED.

AND THEN NEXT WE'RE GOING TO GO TO THE DISCOVERY, WHICH ONCE EVERYBODY HAS BEEN CLEARED, THEY'RE GOING TO SEE IT IS VERY EXTENSIVE.

JUST WITH THOSE TWO STARTING POINTS, WE'RE GOING TO

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GET A PRETTY GOOD IDEA OF THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE OF THIS CASE AND TOPICS THAT ARE COVERED.

LET'S GO FURTHER DOWN THE ROAD AND ASSUME THAT

MR. TESLIK WANTS TO ERR ON THE SIDE OF CAUTION, AND MR. FOGGO

SAYS "THERE'S SOMETHING I WANT TO TALK TO YOU ABOUT, BUT IT

DOESN'T FALL WITHIN THE FOUR CORNERS OF THIS DISCOVERY OF THE

INDICTMENT," THAT, I WOULD ASSUME, AS HAPPENS IN OTHER CASES

AND OTHER TYPES OF ISSUES, IT WOULD HAVE TO GO TO THE COURT TO

SAY, "LOOK, THIS IS -- WE THINK IT'S WITHIN THIS SUBJECT AREA.

YOU MAY DISAGREE, YOUR HONOR. WE WANT TO RAISE IT WITH YOU

AND FIND OUT." MR. LONDERGAN WOULD HAVE TO BE INVOLVED IN

THAT PROCESS.

THE COURT: DO YOU HAVE A PROBLEM WITH THAT, MR. TESLIK?

MR. TESLIK: I'M NOT SURE MECHANICALLY HOW THIS IS
GOING TO WORK. OUR CLIENT HAS BEEN CHARGED WITH FRAUD. SO
CLEARLY, WE HAVE AN OBLIGATION TO DEFEND HIM ON THE MENS REA
ELEMENT. HE'S BEEN CHARGED WITH CAUSING A CONTRACT TO BE LET
UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES THAT WE DISPUTE AND HE DISPUTES. HE IS
GOING TO ABSOLUTELY HAVE TO DEMONSTRATE WHY THOSE CONTRACTS
WERE LET AND UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES.

THIS IS A MAN WHO OVER 80 PERCENT OF HIS WORKDAY WAS INVOLVED IN TOP SECRET PROJECTS, THE HIGHEST -- PROTECTED HIGHER THAN ANY SECURE INFORMATION ONE CAN IMAGINE. WE'RE GOING TO HAVE TO BE FREE TO TALK TO HIM ABOUT WHAT HE WAS

DOING AND WHY HE WAS DOING IT. WHAT I UNDERSTAND MR. FORGE TO BE SAYING IS, "YEAH, BUT YOU'VE GOT TO COME IN TO ASK THE COURT EVERY TIME." THAT'S NOT WORKABLE.

THE COURT: I DON'T SEE IT AS MY AUTHORITY UNDER CIPA TO TRY TO POLICE THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT DISCUSSIONS.

LOOK, MR. FOGGO HAS CONTRACT OBLIGATION THAT

PERTAINED EVEN AS TO HIS COUNSEL. MY OBLIGATION IS TO LOOK AT

MATERIAL THAT THEY BELIEVE IS RELEVANT, ALTHOUGH CLASSIFIED,

AND MAKE A DETERMINATION WHETHER THEY ABSOLUTELY NEED IT,

ACTUALLY WHETHER IT'S RELEVANT, AND WHETHER THERE ARE ANY

PRIVILEGES THAT APPLY OR OTHER LEGAL REASONS THAT IT NOT -- OR

THAT IT NOT COME IN, MAKE A DETERMINATION THAT IT'S USEFUL TO

THEM IN THEIR DEFENSE, AND THEN GIVE YOU THE ELECTION TO TRY

TO SANITIZE IT OR NOT USING IT.

I DON'T THINK IT EXTENDS TO ME SAYING, "NO. BEFORE YOU HAVE A DISCUSSION WITH MR. FOGGO IN YOUR PRIVATE LAW OFFICE, YOU'VE GOT TO COME AND CLEAR THAT WITH ME."

MR. FORGE: I AGREE WITH WHAT YOU'RE SAYING
ENTIRELY. THIS WHOLE DISCUSSION BEGAN WITH MR. TESLIK
ESSENTIALLY ASKING YOUR HONOR TO ENDORSE MR. FOGGO DISCUSSING
IT. MR. FOGGO, AS YOUR HONOR PUT IT PERFECTLY, HE HAS
CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS. I'M NOT TRYING TO CHILL HIS
COMMUNICATION WITH HIS COUNSEL. I KNOW YOUR HONOR IS NOT.

THE COURT: MR. TESLIK, I'M GOING TO LEAVE IT AT

THAT. I'M NOT GOING TO ISSUE ANY ORDER ON THAT. YOU HAVE TO

DO YOUR LEVEL BEST TO DEFEND THIS FELLOW. HE KNOWS WHAT HIS LEGAL OBLIGATIONS ARE BASED ON HIS EMPLOYMENT.

I'M RELUCTANT TO POLICE ANY OF THAT. I'M NOT GOING
TO GET INVOLVED IN YOUR DISCUSSIONS WITH HIM, ATTORNEY-CLIENT
DISCUSSIONS. MY ROLE UNDER THIS IS TO DETERMINE WHAT SEES THE
LIGHT OF DAY IN THE EVENT THERE'S A TRIAL. I'M PREPARED TO DO
THAT. I'M NOT GOING TO GO FURTHER THAN THAT.

MR. TESLIK: HERE'S THE PROBLEM THAT WE FACE: UNDER THE CONTRACT, THE POST-EMPLOYMENT TERMS OF MR. FOGGO'S CONTRACT, HE CAN'T DISCLOSE ANYTHING. HE ABSOLUTELY -- THERE'S NOT A DEFENSE COUNSEL EXCEPTION TO THAT CONTRACT. WE NEED TO COMMUNICATE WITH MR. FOGGO IN ORDER TO PREPARE HIS DEFENSE IN THIS CASE. MR. LONDERGAN TOLD ME "WELL, YOU'RE RIGHT. HE'S NOT CLEARED ANYMORE. BY THE WAY, BECAUSE OF THE CHARGES PENDING AGAINST HIM, HE CAN'T BE CLEARED."

SO SOMEWHERE IN HERE WE'VE GOT TO TALK TO THE MAN.

WE'VE GOT TO LEARN WHAT HE KNOWS THAT WE BELIEVE WOULD BE

MATERIAL TO HIS DEFENSE AND RELEVANT TO RESPONDING TO THE

CHARGES. AND WHAT MR. FORGE IS JUST SAYING IS "WELL,

MR. FOGGO KNOWS WHAT HE CAN'T DISCLOSE," WHICH IS, BY THE WAY,

NOTHING.

THE COURT: I THINK THE FACT THAT THERE ARE CIPA

PROVISIONS THAT CONTEMPLATE THAT THERE COULD BE CLASSIFIED

INFORMATION THAT'S RELEVANT TO THE DEFENSE TRUMP THE CONTRACT

OBLIGATIONS HERE.

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AFTER ALL, THE WHOLE PURPOSE OF THE CIPA PROVISION WAS TO DEAL WITH SITUATIONS LIKE THIS; HIGH-LEVEL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS THAT HAD CLASSIFIED INFORMATION. CONGRESS WAS WELL AWARE THAT THERE WERE CONTRACT OBLIGATIONS. I DON'T THINK THEY READ THOSE AS FORECLOSING A DEFENDANT FROM DISCUSSING WITH HIS LAWYERS HOW HE'S GOING TO DEFEND HIS CASE. AND THE CIPA PROVISIONS ARE AN ATTEMPT TO KEEP THE LID ON THE MOST CLASSIFIED INFORMATION TO PROTECT THE NATIONAL SECURITY WHILE GIVING THE DEFENDANT THE RIGHT TO DEFEND HIMSELF. THAT'S HOW I REGARD IT.

MR. FORGE HAS SPECIFICALLY SAID THEY'RE NOT TRYING
TO CHILL YOUR DISCUSSIONS WITH HIM, NOR AM I. I THINK HE'S
FREE TO TALK WITH YOU. AND THEN IT'S THE DISSEMINATION OF
THAT INFORMATION THAT IS A MATTER FOR THE COURT.

MR. TESLIK: I'M VERY WORRIED ABOUT MR. FOGGO

GETTING HIMSELF INTO TROUBLE BY HAVING THIS CONVERSATION. I

UNDERSTAND WHAT THE COURT'S SAYING. WHAT I WOULD SUGGEST IS

THAT WE PROPOSE AN ORDER TO THE COURT UNDER CIPA SO THAT

MR. FOGGO IS PROTECTED IN THIS SITUATION.

THE COURT: WHY DON'T YOU DO THAT, RUN IT BY

MR. FORGE. THERE MAY BE NO OBJECTION TO IT WHEN HE LOOKS AT

IT.

AGAIN, LET ME REITERATE THAT IT'S NOT THE COURT'S INTENTION NOR GOVERNMENT COUNSEL'S INTENTION TO TRY TO RESTRICT IN ANY WAY THE FLOW OF INFORMATION BETWEEN YOU AND

YOUR CLIENT THAT'S NECESSARY TO DEFEND HIM ON THESE VERY
SERIOUS CHARGES. I'D BE PREPARED TO SIGN SUCH AN ORDER.

MR. TESLIK: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR.

I HAVE ONE JUST FINAL COMMENT.

AS YOU KNOW, THE GOVERNMENT'S BRIEF IN THIS CASE
TOUCHED UPON LOTS OF DIFFERENT CIPA ISSUES, INCLUDING THE
SECTION 5 RESPONSIBILITIES AND THE SECTION 6 RESPONSIBILITIES.
WE DIDN'T BELIEVE THAT NOW WAS THE APPROPRIATE TIME TO CONTEST
SOME OF THE LEGAL POSITIONS THE GOVERNMENT WAS TAKING.

THE COURT: I AGREE.

MR. TESLIK: WE ARE JUST NOT WAIVING ANYTHING.

THE COURT: I AGREE. I'LL RECOGNIZE THAT.

I THINK I'VE SPOKEN TO THE ISSUES YOU'VE RAISED.

THE COURT THEN DENIES THE MOTION TO MODIFY THE PROTECTIVE

ORDER SUBJECT TO AUGMENTATION BY TWO STAND-ALONE ORDERS, ONE
REGARDING NO LEAKING AND CONSEQUENCES FOR DOING SO. IT'S MY

FIRM INTENTION, IF THERE'S ANY MORE LEAKING, TO GET TO THE

BOTTOM OF IT AND TO FIND OUT WHO VIOLATED THE COURT ORDER AND

TO HOLD THAT PERSON ACCOUNTABLE.

SECOND, I'LL SIGN THE ORDER MR. TESLIK'S DISCUSSED PROPOSING THAT HE AND MR. MAC DOUGALL BE ABLE TO DISCUSS FREELY ALL OF THE INFORMATION NECESSARY IN ORDER TO HELP THEM PREPARE TO DEFEND MR. FOGGO.

OBVIOUSLY, THOSE ORDERS WOULD APPLY TO YOU AND YOUR CLIENT AS WELL, MR. GERAGOS. WE NEED TO GET TO YOUR ISSUE

HERE FAIRLY QUICKLY. I DO HAVE SOME CONCERN OF BALANCING HIS 1 2 RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL, WHICH HE'S ASSERTED, AND RESOLVING 3 THESE OTHER ISSUES. FILE THOSE AS OUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. 4 MR. GERAGOS: I WILL, YOUR HONOR. 5 WE ALSO HAVE A BOND ISSUE. MR. HALPERN AND COUNSEL 6 AND I SPOKE BEFOREHAND. THE ONE KIND OF NUB IS THERE IS A 7 CROSS-COLLATERALIZATION ON THE HOUSE THAT IS ALSO ON THE 8 PROPERTY. IT'S A CREDIT LINE. THAT CREDIT LINE, EVEN THOUGH IT'S ON THERE FOR 7 MILLION, IS ONLY \$700,000. 9 10 WHAT WE HAVE AGREED IS THAT I WOULD MAKE THE 11 REPRESENTATION THAT I BELIEVE ON APRIL 9TH, THERE'S A 12 TENTATIVE CLOSE DATE ON THE PROPERTY THAT WILL TAKE CARE OF 13 THAT \$700,000 WHEN THE PROPERTY SELLS. 14 THE COURT: IT WILL BE UP TO A MILLION AND A HALF IN PROPERTY VALUE THEN? 15 16 MR. GERAGOS: WE HAVE SOMEWHERE IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD 17 OF 1.3. 18 THE COURT: THAT'S AGREEABLE? 19 MR. FORGE: THAT WILL BE FINE. ONCE THAT CREDIT 20 LINE HAS BEEN PAID DOWN, THAT CREDIT LINE WILL BE 21 TERMINATED. 22 MR. GERAGOS: TERMINATED OR IT WOULD NOT BE DRAWN 23 UPON SO THAT THE GOVERNMENT -- MR. WILKES JUST GAVE ME THE 2.4 HIGH SIGN, WHICH MEANS IT WILL BE TERMINATED. 25 THE COURT: IT'S ALREADY BEEN DONE?

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1	THE DEFENDANT: ONCE IT'S PAID OFF, IT WILL BE
2	TERMINATED.
3	THE COURT: THAT'S APRIL 9TH?
4	MR. GERAGOS: HOPEFULLY, THE DEAL CLOSES.
5	THE COURT: HERE'S WHAT I'VE DONE: I'VE AGREED TO
6	CONTINUE HIM ON THE CURRENT BOND PURSUANT TO YOUR EX PARTE
7	APPLICATION. THAT ORDER WILL REMAIN IN EFFECT UNTIL APRIL 9TH
8	WITH THE UNDERSTANDING THAT ONCE THE CREDIT LINE IS
9	EXTINGUISHED, THE PROPERTY VALUE SUPPORTING THE BOND WILL BE
10	APPROXIMATELY A MILLION THREE.
11	MR. GERAGOS: THANK YOU.
12	THE COURT: ANYTHING ELSE?
13	MR. GERAGOS: NOT FROM US.
14	THE COURT: WE'RE IN RECESS.
15	MR. PITOFSKY: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR.
16	000
17	
18	
19	I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE TESTIMONY
20	ADDUCED IN THE FOREGOING MATTER IS
21	A TRUE RECORD OF SAID PROCEEDINGS.
22	
23	S/ EVA OEMICK 1-30-09
24	EVA OEMICK DATE
25	OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER